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Summary findings
Since  January 1990, Poland's social safety net has  poverty. These proposals arc either budget-neutral or
changed greatly. Unemployment  benefits ware  imply only modest increases  in the total amount of
introduced, for example,  because of escalating  transfers:
unemployment (about 15 percent of the labor force  at  *  Income-testing  the family  allowance and doubling
the end of 1993). The cost of the social safety net has  the amount for large households. This would reduce
risen sharply since the transition began, both absolutely  poverty from 14.4 to 13.2 percent - and, among large
and as a fraction of GDP. In 1993, social transfers  households, from 43 to 28 percent.
accounted for 18.7 percent of GDP, as follows: (1)  * Reducing eligibility  for the family allowance  from
pensions  = 14.9 percent, (2) unemployment  benefits= 1.9  2C  to 18 years and taxing the allowance; providing
percent, (3) family  allowance  and other social  income-tested  daycare vouchers for young children.  This
insurance= 1.4 percent, and (4) social assistance=0.5  would make the family  allowance  more progressive.
percent.  Reducing eligibility  and taxing the allowance  would raise
To investigate  the present system's impact on income  poverty about I percentage  point, which would be
distribution,  Grootacrt uses the household budget survey  largely  offset by the daycare  vouchers.
data for January-June 1993, the first complete survey of  * Improving income testing for social assistance.  More
the Polish population. The conventional benchmark for  than half of current beneficiaries  arc not poor. A 20
measuring  poverty in Poland, the socia!  minimum, has  percent improvement in targeting would reduce poverty
become largely  irrelevant, as 55 percent of the people fall  by about 0.3 percentage points.
below that spending  level. Using two other measures,  - Extending eligibility  for unemployment benefits for
Grootaert finds that in 1993 26.3 percent of the  low-skilled  unemployed members of the labor force in
population had an expenditure level (per adult  large households. This would increase benefits by about
equivalent)  below the minimum wage, and 14.4 percent  7 percent, but reduce poverty about 0.4 percentage
were spending at a level below the minimum pension.  points - benefiting especially  the poorest part of the
He discusses  four proposals for improving the ability  population.
of social  transfers (other than pensions) to reduce
This  paper-a  productof  the Country  Operations  Division,  Europc  and  CentralAsia,  Country  Departmnent  II-is  part of a larger
effort in the department  to undertake poverty  assessments  in the regon. Copies  of the paper are available  free from the World
Bank, 1818 H Street  NW, Washington,  DC 20433. Please  contact  Nona Sachdeva,  room SS029, extension  82717  (79 pages).
March 1995.
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The objective  of this study  is to answer the question  how the current (1993)  system  of
social  transfers  in Poland  helps  the poor  and, as a corollary,  whether  reallocation  of funds  across
different  types of social transers could have a greater povert  alleviation  impact. Tuie  impact
of social transfers on poverty is an important  element  of the extesnal  efficiency  of the social
safety  net.
Since  the start of tansition in Poland  in January 1990,  the social  safety  net has undergone
important  changes.  The major  one was  the introduction  of unemployment  benefits,  as a result
of rapidly  emerging  unemployment. At the end of 1993,  unemployment  was estimated  at 15
percent of the labor forre. In 1993,  social  transfers accounted  for 18.7  percent of GDP:
*  pensions  14.9 percent  of GDP
*  unemployment  benefits  1.9 percent  of GDP
*  family  allowance  and other social  insurance  1.4 percent of GDP
•  social  assistance  0.5 percent  of GDP
The cost of the social safety  net has risen sharply since transition,  both in absolute  real
terms and as a ftacton of GDP. In the climate of fiscal stringency,  the Government  of Poland
has understandably  been  concened to control  the growti of the social  budget and to ensure  that
spending achieves the  desired distributional objectives. Several proposals have  been
implemented,  and others debated, to revise the social safety  net in order to meet better these
twin objectives.  It seems useful therefore  to investigate  in some  detail what the distnbutional
impact  is of the current system,  and how it helps to alleviate  poverty  in Poland.
To that effect,  this study  uses the most  recent available  data, namely  the 1993  Household
Budget  Survey  (January-June  data). This survey is the first one in Poland  to cover completely
the population.  Prior surveys provided representatve results only for the four main socio-
economic  groups:  worker  households,  farmer  households,  mixed  worker-farmer  households  and
pensioner households. Since transition, two new  socio-economic  groups have  ernerged:
households who obtain thir  main eamings from self-employment  activities in  the non-
agcultural  prvate  sector ("self-employed'), and households  whose main income source is
social transfers  other than pensions  or whose main eamings come from casual work ("social
income  recipients").  The 1993  survey  covers  all six socio-economic  groups.
The conventional  benchmark  for measunng  poverty  in Poland,  the social  minimum,  has
lost much of its relvance since  transition.  In 1993,  55 percent of the Polish  population  had an
ependiture level below the social minimum,  which makes  it no longer  useful as a criterion  to
identify  people  in poverty. (Mhe  Institute  of Labor and Social Affairs  is curently developing  a
new method  of cculating  the socal mminum.) Poverty has therefore  been measured  against
two other "minima": the minimum  pension  and the minimum  wage. In 1993,  26.3 percent of
the population  had an expenditure  level (per equivalent  adult) below the minimum  wage, and
14.4 percent  had expenditure  below the minimum  pension.-ii-
Poverty Profri
Among  the socio-econondc  groups, the highest  and the lowest  poverLy  incidences  ocur
in the two new groups ahich have emerged since tntion,  espectively,  the social income
recipients  and the self-amployed.  This suggests  that transition  has widened  the distribution  of the
level of living by extending  the two ends of the distribution.  The second lowest poverty
incidence  occurs among pensioners  and workers, of whom about 11 percent live below the
minimum  pension. For pensioners,  this is a reversal  of the situation  prior to transition,  when
they consistently  had the highest  poverty  figures. For groups with an active  connection  to the
labor market,  the highest  pove  is now recorded  among farmers.
The regional va,ion  in poverty incidence  is less pronounced  than across soco-
economic  group. The Warsaw-repon  has the lowest  poverty  incxence, followed  by te  South.
The highest poverty incidence  is in the South-East and Central-West. Together those two regions
comprise 30 percent of all poor.  The absence of strong regional variation in poverty incidence
is surprising because different regions in Poland have been affected very differently by economic
transition. This could well be a  testimony to  the well-functioning of the safety net,  which,
especially  through  unemployment  benefits  and pensions,  has been able to compensate  people  to
a large degree for the costs of transition,  and has effectvely prevented  that a large number  of
them fall into poverty.
Neverheless, there is a saial  dbnension  to poverty:  poverty  incidence  is much  higher
in viages  and m small cities. In large cities (more than 200,000 inhabitants), only 5.5 percent
of people live below the minmum  pension. This percentage uniformly rises with smaLer city
size, and reaches 22 percent in villages. A similar pattern exists relative to the minimum  wage.
Demographic  characderisics  are important  indicators of poverty in Poland. This is
especially  the case for type of household.  Only 3.4 percent of childless  couples  fall below the
mnimum pension  - many of these households  are pensioners.  The poverty incidence  rses
steadily  with the number of children. Among households  with four or  more children,  42.6
percent have an  pendimture  level per equivalent adult below the minimum penon,  and 60.8
percent fall below the minimum wage.
One corollary of this is that poverty  anong children is high in Poland - one in five
children lives in a household with an expenditure  level below the minimum  pension. In contrast,
the  poveity rate wnong elderly  people (60+) is only 7.6 percent - one half the national average.
The strong correlation between poverty and presence of children in the household, makes the
presce  of children an important candidate for the targeting of socidal  transfers. Currently, only
the family allowance and maternity care are based on this criterion. By the same token, the
social safety net seems qmite  effective at protectig  elderly people against poverty and further
old-age-based interventions do not appear warranted at this time.- ii  -
There is a strong inverse link between  poveily and educadion.  Where the head of
household  has only vocational  or elementary  education,  poverty  incidence  is twice  as high  as in
households  with more  education.  Almost  two ffiirds  of the Polish  population  lives  in households
where the head has only vocational  or elementuay  educadon.
One  remarkable  feature  of the poverty  profile  in Poland  is the relatively  low  poveny gap
and its very even  distribution  across  all socio-economic  groups,  regions, or types-of  households.
The average  poverty gap is 16 percent of the minimum  wage and 13 percent of the minimum
pension  and varies  by no more an  two to three  percentage  points  regardless  of the classification
considered.  This indicates  that there is no one group or region in Poland which  forms a pocket
of deep  poverty  (at least  at the level of aggregation  considered  in this study).  The sole  exception
is the social income recpients who not only have the highest  poverty incidence  but whose
poverty  is also more severe  than any other group.
Poverty and Unemployment
Unemployment  is perhaps  the most visible  social  ill resulting  from transition  - in 1993
it affected over 15 perc:ent  of the labor force. Unemployment  is a major cause of poverty  in
Poland. The poverty rate amnong  households  where there is at least one unemployed  person  is
27.8 percent - almost  twice  the national  average. Over one third of all poor live in households
where there is an unemployed  member.
The link between  poverty and unemployment  is strongest in worker and pensioner
households, and in social income recipients householas, where 80 percent of poverty is linked
to  unemployment. However,  it  is  the  regional  structure  of  poverty  which  has  the  most
pronounced link  vifth  unemployment. In the five regions with the lowest poverty incidence, the
structure of poverty is virtually the same. save for poverty due to unemployment. In the other
four  regions,  differences in  poverty  among  children and  the  elderly  explain most of  the
differences in total poverty.
The strong link between poverty and unemployment  indicates that pro-active labor market
policies aimed at employment creation need to be an important ingredient of poverty alleviation
policy in Poland.  Where these policies are geared in the first place to providing work to the
unemployed,  they will have  the most immediate  poverty  alleviation  impact. However,  the link
between poverty and educatLon  suggests that improved  training and education  deserves  an
important  role in poverty  alleviation  for the medium  and longer  term.-iv-
Benericiaries  of the Socil  Safety Net
This study has distinguished  five main categories  in the social safety net in Poland:
pensions, unemployment  benefits, family allowances (including  elderly care), other social
insurance,  and social  assistance.
Pensions are the most commonly  received  benefit - by 53 percent of households.  All
pensioner  households  of course  receive  pensions,  but so do over 50 percent  of farmer  and mixed
households  and about one fourth of worker households.  The second  most commonly  received
social transfer, by 50 percent of households,  is the family allowance.  Around two thirds of
worker, mixed,  and self-employed  households  receive  it. Other  forms  of social  insurance  (mainly
matrnity and childcare  benefits)  are received  only by 3.3 percent  of households.
Unemployment  benefits are  received by  9.3  percent of households, fairly evenly
distributed  over the main socio-economic  groups. However, 56.6 percent of social income
recipients  received unemployment  benefits. Since over 70 percent of all households  in this
category  contain an unemnployed  peon,  this indicates  a concentration  of unemployed  who no
longer  receive  benefits  in this group. Lastly, social  assistance  is received  by 3.6 percent  of all
households.  It is received  fairly equally  by the different socio-economic  groups, except  for the
two post-transition  groups. Less than one percent of self-employed  households  benefit from
social assistance  but 29 percent of social income recipient households  receive it. There are
vitually no differences  by  ity-si  and only minor  regional  differences.
The  extent to which each component  of the social safety net is targeted  towanrs  the
poor differs significantly.  Only 41 percent of households  below the minimum  pension  receive
a pension, against  55 percent of households  above the minimum  wage. The average  pension
received  by poor households  is 1,851,900 zl. per month, which is well above the minimum
pension  and the minimum  wage  (but this amount  contributes  of course  to the expenditure  of the
entire household).  In contrast, the average  pension  received  by the non-poor  is 3,080,900  zL
Thus, a higher percentage  of non-poor  receive pensions,  and the amount they receive is also
larger.
Unemployment  benefits are much more targeted to the poor: 19.2 percent of poor
households  receive  them,  against  only  7.2 percent  of non-poor  households.  The average  monthly
benefit  is 1,330,000  zl. and does  not differ by income-level  of the recipient.  Family allowances
are also proportionately  more received by poor households, but to a lesser degree than
unemployment  benefits: 64.1 percent of poor households  receive te  allowances  against  46.6
percent of non-poor  households.  The amount received  by poor households  (498,300 zl. per
month)  is also  40 percent  higher  than that received  by non-poor  households  (mainly  because  poor
households  have  more children).  Other social  insurance are only received  by a small  number
of households,  but three times  more frequently  by poor than non-poor  households.  This  targeting
is offset  though  by the fact that the amounts  received  by non-poor  households  are much  larger
than those  received  by the poor.Social  assistance  is wdl targetd towards  the poor: 9.6 percent  of households  below  the
minimum  pension  benefit  from soal  assistance,  aganst only 2.5 percent  of households  above
the minimum  wage. This atio of almost  4:1 is the best of any component  of the social safety
net. It stands  to rason  that fte income-testing  of socal assistance  contributes  to this. However,
the amounts  received  are slightly  higher  for non-poor  recipients.  On average,  farmer  households
receive the least amount  of socal assistance  and social income  recipient  households  the most.
In  wa4 Ihe  social saey  net in Poland  represents  44.9 percent of the expenditure  of
an average  household.  Pensions  are the lion's share  of this, and by themselves  contribute  36.5
percent to household  expenditure.  Unemployment  benefits  represent  tuce percent  of household
expenditure  and all other non-pension  benefits  5.5 percent.
The social safety net is mildy pngressive,  representing 55.1 percent of  average
expenditure  of households  below the minmum penson  and 42.7 percent of expenditre  of
households  above  the minimum  wage. However,  this is the sum  of two very different  effects,
due to pensions  and  the other transfers.  The share  of household  expenditure  covered  by pensions
is actually  lower for the poor han the non-poor.  In contrast,  unemployment  benefits  contrbutes
9.2 percent to the expenditure  of the poor and only 1.8 percent to the expenditure  of the non-
poor (a ratio  of 5.1:1). The remaining  social  transfers make  up 15.6  percent  of the expenditure
of the poor against  3.7 percent of those of the non-poor  (a ratio of 4.2:1). The  ty of
the social  safety  net in Poland  is thus entirely  due to the non-pension  components,  especially  the
unemployment  benefits  and the family  allowance.
Closing  the Poverty Gap
The success  of a social  transfer  system  is not only measured  by the degree  to which  the
benefits  are received  by the poor, but also by the extent to which it contributes  to closing  the
povefly gap. This depends  on the extent to which  transfers  go to people  or households  who are
poor prior to the receipt of the given benefit (ex-ante targeting) and on the amount of the benefit
m relation  to the poverty  gap. While the social  transfer  system  in Poland  is fairly successful  in
ex-ante targeting, a substantial  degree of leakage occurs. Unemployment  benefits  and social
assistance go for almost 50 percent to households who were not poor (above minimum pension)
before they received these benefits. In the case of humily allowance, 80 percent of recpients
were not poor prior to the receipt of the allowance. This means that, depending on the type of
transfer, from 30 to 60 percent of the amounts of money being tansferred  go to the non-poor.
This suggests  thatthere is significant  room in the system  for reaflocation  in favor of the poor.
For those recipients of social transfers who are poor prior to the receipt of the transfer,
one can ask how many of them are moved above the povry  line as a result of the transfer.
Because  pensions are by far the largest component  of the safety net, they contibute the most
to keeping  people  out of poverty: 63 percent  of households  who receive  pensions  would  become
poor without  them. Although  the regional distribution  of pensions  is quite even, the poverty
reducing effect of pensions is markedly  lower in villages  than in cities.-vi  -
The second best poverty alleviation  effect is achieved  by unemployment  benefits: 30
percent  of recipients  would  be below the poverty  line without  the benefits.  This effect  is highest
in pensioner  and social  income  recipient  households.  It is also  larger in small  cities  and villages
than in large cities. The poverty reduction  impact of unemployment  benefits  diminishes  with
household  size:  45 percent  of childless  couples  receiving  unemployment  benefits  are lifted  above
the poverty line, but only 22 percent of couples with four or more children.  In contrast,  the
famly  allowance,  which  is targeted  by the number  of children,  lifts 16  percenit  of large  recipient
families  out of poverty, against  2.3 percent of recipient  fmilies with one child. Overall  though,
the family  allowances  have only a small  effect on poverty: 6.2 percent of recipient  households
are lifted  above the poverty  line thanw to the allowance.
Social assistance, the sole income-tested component of the safety net, helps one in four
recipients  escape  poverty.  Somewhat  strangely,  this effect  is concentrated  in low-povmrty  groups
such as pensioners  and the self-employed,  among whom only a very small  percentage  receive
social assistance.  This suggests  that social assistance  does reach the few needy  households n
those groups and makes  a significant  difference  for them.
A further assessment  of the social safety net's ability  to help the poor can be made  by
showing  the tn=sfers received  by the poor as a fmction of the poveny gap. In total,  the social
transfers  received  by the poor are 215 percent of the (remaining)  poverty  gap. This means  that
without  the transfers the poverty  gap would be about 3.2 times larger. However,  the transfers
received  by non-poor  people  are almost  22 times  larger  than the poverty  gap.  The unemployment
benefit  and the fimily allowances  received  by non-poor  households  would each  be sufficient  to
more han cover the entre poverty  gap. While in practice  it is of course  unlikely  and probably
undesirable  that such drastic  reoientation would ever takle  place, it does underline  that there is
scope  m the total resource  base of the safety net to reorient  funds towards  the poor.
Modifying  the Social Safety Net
Four proposals  are made  to improve  selectively  the poverty  reduction  impact of social
transfers other than pensions.  The proposals are either budget-neutral  or imply only modest
increases in the total amount of transfers (which could easily be financed out of anticipated
savings  from proposed  reforms  of the pension  system).
Proposal  A  Income-testing  the family allowance  and doublng the amountfor large
househols.  This responds  to the situation  whereby  the freezing  of the nominal  amount  of the
family  allowance  since  mid-1992  has disproportionately  hurt the poor. A one-time  revision of
the amount  is recommended  to ensure  adequate  coverage  of a basket of children's goods and
services at today's prices, after which te  amount would remain constant  in real terms. The
proposal also ams  to reduce poverty  among children,  which is twice the national  average  in
Poland. Overall, the proposal  would reduce poverty from 14.4 percent to 13.2 percent, but
among  large households  the reduction  would be from 43 percent to 28 percent. The proposal
would  also benefit farmer  households  and rural areas  in -general.Vii  -
Proposal B: Reducing eligIbilIty  of family aoowance to 18 years and taxing the
allowance;  providing  income-tested  day-care  vouchersforyoung children.  The first  part of this
proposal  aims to reduce  a generous  eligibility riterion and to improve  the progresivity of the
family  allowance.  This vwould  however  raise poverty  by about one percentage  point, especially
among large households and  worker households. The day-care vouchers would largely
compensate  for this effect. They would also have beneficial  indirect effects, by releasing  an
important  current constraint,  especially  on mothers,  to take up a job.
Proposal  C: Improved  income-testig of socia asslwiance.  Socal assistance  is currently
the only income-tested  component  of  the social safety net in Poland. Even though social
assistance is  better targeted than the other social safety net components, 55 percent of
beneficiaries  are rnon-poor  and the amounts  paid to non-poor  households  are actually  higher  than
those paid to the poor. This suggests  that the targeting of social assistance  could be still
improved  by more effective  income-sting. If improved  income-testing  reduces  payments  to non-
poor households  by 20 percent, this would  permit an increase  of payments  to poor households
by 30 percent  and cover  increased  administration  costs of the income-testing,  in a budget-neutral
fashion.  Poverty would be reduced  by about 0.3 percentage  points.
Proposal  D: Extending  egibilityfor unemployment  beneftfor  low silled unemployed
in Lrge households. Current eligibility  for unemployment  benefits  is limited  to 12 months  in
most  cases. This hurts  disproportionately  low-skilled  workers  whose  chances  of finding  a  job are
low in the current economic  environment.  The unemployment  benefit  could also make  a larger
contribution  to closing the poverty gap for social income recipients  households  where many
unemployed  who have lost their benefits are concentrated,  and for large households.  It is
proposed  to extend the eligibility  for unemployed  whose  highest  education  is primary  or lower
vocational  school  and who are members  of large households.  An extension  by 12 months  would
increase  recipients  by about sc.ien  percent. It would reduce  poverty  by about 0.4 percent,  but
concentrated  in current  high-poverty  groups.L  Badiground and Objectives
1.  This paper aims  to answer  the question  how the current  (1993)  system  of social  tnsfrs
in Poland  helps  the poor. As a corolary, the paper wiMl  investigate  whether  reallocation  of funds
across different types of social transfers can have a greater poverty alleviation  impact. The
specific  poverty-focus  of the investigation  implies that the question  of internal  efficiency  of the
social  trnsfer  system  will not be addressed  (this  has been  done  in World  Bankc,  1993).  However,
the effect  of social  transfers  on poverty  is an important  element  of the external  efficiency  of the
system. The scape of this paper is limited  to cash transfers.'
2.  Since the start of transition in Poland, in January 1990, the social safety net 2 has
undergone  important  changes.  The major  one is the introduction  of unemployment  benefits,  as
a result of rapidly emerging  unemployment.  At the end of 1993,  unemployment  was estimated
at 15 percet  of the labor force. The recent changes in the social safety net and a detailed
description  of the current  system  are in World  Bank (1993)  and Rutkowski  (1991)  and need  not
be repeated  here. For this study, we have  grouped  the different  elements  of the safety  net in five
categories:
(a)  pensions  (retirement,  disability,  and survivor  pensions);
(b)  unemployment  benefits;
1. Tnsfeii  ia kind occur mainly thuough  the pmvision of education  and heath care, and through consumer
subie  Since tasion,  the reative  izortane  of them Ia  been decrasing  stealy.
2.  The temis -social sa ety net" and  socal tansfis  systmw are used inkerhangebly  in this report.-2  -
(c)  family  allowance  (including  benefits  for care for the elderly);
(d)  other socal insurance  benefits  (matity,  childcare  and other social insurance
benefits  administ  by the enterprises  or the social insurance  offices  ZUS and
KRUS);
(e)  social  assistance  benefits  (administered  at the communal  (gmina)  level).
3.  In 1993,  social transfers  accounted  for 18.7 percent of GDP:
*  pensions  14.9 percent of GDP
*  unemployment  benefits  1.9 percent of GDP
*  family  allowance  and
other social  insurance  1.4 percent of GDP
*  social  assistance  0.5 percent of GDP
4.  The cost of the social  safety  net has risen sharply  since transition,  both in absolute  real
terms and as a fraction  of GDP. In the climate  of fiscal  stringency,  the Government  of Poland
has understandably  been concerned  to control  the growth  of the social  budget  and to ensure  that
spending achieves the  desired  distrbutional  objectives. Several proposals have  been
implemented,  and others debated, to revise the social  safety net in order to meet better these
twin objectives.
5.  In 1993, the indexation  of pensions  to cost-of-living  increases  was reduced from 100
percent to 91 percent of the amount of the pension, while at the same time the ratio of the
minimum  pension  to the average  wage  was increased  from 35 percent to 39 percent (and from-3  -
27 percent to 30 percent for certin  disability pensions). Consideration  has been given to
increasing  the retirement  age and to tightening  the eligibility  crteria for disability  pensions.
6.  In  1993, eligibility for  unemployment benefits required a  stronger labor-market
connection  than was the case earlier (although  many exemptions  remained). The peiod over
which  benefits  were paid was limited  to 12 months,  except  for workers  close  to retirement,  and
in high unemployment  regions.  However,  concern  remained  about  the total cost of the benefits,
and the efficiency  of their targeting.
7.  The family  allowance  is a general  benefit, extended  to all families  where there  is a wage-
earner or self-employed  person. The allowance  is paid for each  child up to age 16, or up to age
20 if the child is enrolled  in school  (except for farmer households  where fte family  allowance
is income-tested).  Since  the amount  is not indexed, it has been  falling  in real terms. Proposals
have  been'  discussed  to add a low-income  condition  to the allowance.
8.  Several of these (and other) proposals have the potential  of substantlly  altering  the
social safety  net and its pattern of incidence.  It seems useful therefore  to investigate  in some
detail what the distnbutional  impact is of the cunrent  system, and how it helps to alleviate
poverty  in Poland. This report will undertake  four tasks:
(a)  a brief review will be given of the profile of poverty in Poland (section  3);
special  attention  is paid to the role of unemployment  (section  4);-4  -
(b)  the amount of transfers and the distribution  of beneica  will be examined
(secton  5);
(c)  the impact of each element  of the social safet  net on poverty  will be estimated
(secon  6);
(d)  a simulation  of selected proposals to revise  he system will be undertaken  to
assess ther impact on poverty (secion 7).
E.  Data and Methodological  Considerations
9.  Tis  study  uses the most  recent  available  data to assess  the impact  of the social  safety  net
on the level of living  of households.  It is based on the 1993  Household  Budget  Survey  (January-
June  data),  which is the first survey  in Poland  to cover completely  the poplation. Prior surveys
provided representative results only for  the  four  main socio-economic  groups: worker
households,  farmer households,  mixed worker-famer households  and pensoer  households.
Since trnsition,  two new socio-economic  groups have emerged:  households  who obtain their
main eamings  from self-employment  actvities in the non-agriculura private sector (herafter
called  "self-employed"),  and households  whose  main  income  source  is social  tansfers other  dtan
pensions or whose mmn eanings come from casual work (hereafter  called "social income
recipients'). The 1993  survey  covers  all six socio-ecnomic groups  and all resut  in this paper
will  include  a breakdown  by those  groups  (Annex 1  provides  further  informaticn  on the survey).-5-
10.  Next to socio-economic  category,  three  other dimensions  are important  in considering
the impact of social transfers: region, type of localy,  and demogrphic type of household.
Region  is important  because  of regional  price differences  and because  certain  social problems,
such as unemployment,  have a strong regional concentration.  In this study, regional price
differences  have  been fully taken  into account  by deflating  all income  and expenditure  figures
with a  regional price index, based on prices for about 200 goods and services for each
voivodship  (details  are in Annex  2). Although  for some  individual  items  price differences  of 20-
30 percent or more were observed,  in the aggregate  no region had a price level which differed
by more than two percent from the Warsaw-region  (Table 1).
Table  1.  Regional  pnce  indx
iRegion  Main  Regionl  price inde
(referen=Centr9-
I_________________  sca  ta  region)
Central-capi  Warsaw  100.00
Central  Lodz  99.18
Cental-East  Lublin  98.58
CentI-West  Po7Zzm  98.14
North  Gdansk  100.95
North-East  Bialystok  100.42
South  Katovice  100.79
South-East  Kaow  98.16
South-West  Wmc3aw  102.08
11.  In addition  to region, the analysis  will also distinguish  the type of locality  because
the economic  and socal evolution  may differ in urban and rumral  areas, and in large and small
cities.  Lastly, the demographic  characteristics  of  households are important because they- 6 -
influence  eligibility  for social  transfers  and determine  in part the household's  ability  to respond
to economic  change.
12.  An important  methodological  point to be addressed  is whether to use household
income  or expendumre  as basis for the analysis.  Most  previous  work on poverty  and incidence
of social transfers in Poland has relied on income (see e.g. M;lanovic, 1992 and Topka,
1993). The main reason for this was the high quality of income data in Polish household
surveys, e.g., all wages  reported  by workers  were cross-checked  with the fms  who paid them.
This practice has disappeared  after transtion,  and there is now evidence of senous under-
reporting  of income  especially  for income from the private sector.
13.  When we compare  household  income with expenditure in the 1993 survey  (on an
equivalent  adult basis), reported income falls significantly  short of reported expenditure  for
fanners, the self-employed  and social income recipients (Table 2).  For the self-employed
reported  income  is barely 25 percent of reported  expenditure.  This situation  may well improve
over tlme as the survey  methodology  becomes  better adapted  to the new economic  reality of
households, but we feel that for 1993 reported expenditure  is a better basis for analysis.
Moreover,  there are theoretical  advantages  to using  household  expenditure  for poverty  analysis,
because  it is deemed  to reflect  better  permanent  income  (see  e.g. Deaton  and  Muellbauer,  1980).- 7 -
Table 2.  Average  housebold  expenditu  and income  per equivaleat  adult  ('000  71. per  month).
Household expenditr  Household  income  Income as
per equivalent  adult  pe  equqivalent  adult  of expenditur
Worker  2,642.0  2,641.0  99.9%
Farmer  1,980.5  1,297.3  65.5%
Worker-fiamer  2,001.4  1,889.8  94.4%
Pensioner  2,601.4  2,461.9  94.6%
Self-employed  3,057.6  777.7  25.4%
Social income  recipient  1,473.0  1,090.6  74.0%
All  2,517.7  2,308.3  91.7%
14.  The use of household  expenditure  implies of course some discontinuity  with past
analysis.  However, it tums out that, in the aggregate, this does not make too much difference
for incidence analysis. As Table 3 shows, in  1993 social transfers were 38.4 percent of
household  income, and 34.6 percent of household  expditure.  (Differences  for specific  socio-
economic  groups are of course  much larger, due to under-reporting  of income.)  These  figures
are ratio esimates, which were also used in most earlier work because  the analysis  was based
on grouped data. Implicitly,  this approach  weighs all observations  by the level of household
income  or expenditure  and thus the results are more  influenced  by the rich than by the poor. A
poverty-onented  analysis  is better served  with a household-level  data set, which permits  to use
the household  (or individual)  as unit of analysis,  and thus to give each  household  (or individual)
the same  importance.  As the last column  in Table 3 shows, switching  from a rato-estimate  to
one based on household shares greatly increases the percent of expenditure accounted for by
social  transfes,  from 35 percent to 45 percent. This is to be expected  because the share of
transfers  is much higher  for poorer households.-8-
Table 3. Social tnferu  as pernap  of income vs. expenditr  (all households).
Percet  of income  Peret  of expendite  Percent of expenditur
(ratio estimae)  (ratio estimate)  (average of household
sba)
Worker  14.9  14.9  16.9
Farmer  37.2  24.3  27.3
Workr-fimer  26.9  25.9  26.9
Pensioner  87.9  83.6  91.0
Self-employed  38.6  9.4  12.0
Social bemefit  recpients  73.6  50.8  56.7
AUl  38.4  34.6  44.9
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15.  In  summary, this  study will be  based on household expenditure. Household
composition  has been  ken into account  by expressing  expenditure  on a per equivalent  adult
basis.  We have applied  the OECD-scale,  which is widely  used in Poland  (first adult = 1; other
adults = 0.7; children  less than 14 years = 0.5). All monetary  figures  (imcome,  expenditure,
socal tansfers) have been expressed  in June 1993 pnces and have been deflated wnth  the
reginal  price index (see Annex  2).-9  -
UL  Poverty Profile
16.  Prior to transition,  most poverty  analysis  classified  people  as poor  when  ther income
fell  below  the  soc.il  mnwmunm  calculated  by  the  Institute  of  Labor  and  Social  Affairs
(Mlanovic, 1992).  Based  on that benchmark,  poverty  incidence  fluctuated  between  10 percent
and 20 percent for most of the eighties. In recent years, the social minimum  has lost much  of
its relevanc,  since the method  of calculation  was not adapted  to the new economic  trends.  In
1993, 55 percent of the Polish  population  had an expenditure  level below the social  mii
(which  in June 1993 was 2,110,000 zl. per month  - i.e., $122 at the then prvailing exchange
rate of $1 =  17,352  zl. ). This makes  it no longer  useful as a criterion  to identify  people  in
poverty. At the timw  of writing,  the listimte of Labor  and Social  Affairs  was in the process  of
developing  a new method  of calculating  the social  mmum.
17.  We have therefore used two other "minima" to identify the poor: the mininum  wage
and the minimnm pension.  The fcrmer is based on the actual expenditure of the poorest 20
percent  of households  (to  which several  adjustments  are made)  and has thus  an implicit  meaning
for poverty analysis.
3 In June 1993, the minimum wage was 1,500,000 zl. ($86) per month and
26.3 percent of Polish people had an expenditure  level below it. The minimum  pension  is
detennined  as a percentage  of average  wages,  in order  to ensure  that a minimum  living  standard
3.  The minimum wage calculaticn starts from  the expenditure of  the poonrst 20 percnt  of households,
excludig  expnditue  on acohol and tobacco and an certain servces such as adult education,  which is adjusted  for
inflati  with the consumer prce  index. Adjusted expenditure  are then multiplied with te  average wage share  in
houshold  income  and with the average number of dependents  in the poorest 20 percent of worker households.- 10  -
is maintained  for pensioners.  In June Z)93, it was 1,231,300  zl. per month  ($71). At that time,
this corresponded  to 35 percent  of average  wage (the raio has since  been raised  to 39 percent),
and 14.4 percent of the population  had an expenditure  level lower thun the minimum  pension.
This sharply  lower percentage  relative  to the popub'.ion  below the minimum  wage, indicates  a
significant  bunching of the population  distinbution  between  the two mnuma.  In tis  range, the
estimate of poverty incidence  is thus fairly sensitive  to the selection  of the poverty line. On
average, each  increase  of the poverty  line by 10,000  zl. will increase  the poverty  incidence  by
0.44 percentage  points.  However,  the concenation of people  between  the minimum  pension  and
minimum  wage also implies  that poverty  in Poland (as defined by the minimum  wage) is not
very deep.
i8.  In the rest of this section,  we look at the incidence  of poverty  and fte distribution  of
the poor along the main socio-economic,  regional, and demographic  characteristics  of the
population.
19.  Povery incidence (the percentage  of people  below the poverty line) varies much
across fte different socio-economc groups (Table 4). It is highest  among the social income
recipients  and lowest  among  the self-employed.  These two new socio-econoric groups can be
seen as containing  the people  who, respectively,  have  filed and succeeded  to adjust  to economic
transition.  The fact that the two cxtremes  in poverty incidence  occur in the two new post-
trantion  groups, is one indication  that transition  has widened  the distribution  of the level of
living, extending  it both at the lower  and upper  end. The second  lowest  poverty  incidence  occurs- 11 -
among pensioners and workers: in each group, about 11 percent have a level of living below the
minimum pension and another 10 percent are between the two minima. For pensioners, these
are fairly low figures and indicate that the pension system in Poland is quite effective in ensuring
pensioners a minimum standard of living. This is an important reversal from the situafion  in the
eighties, when pensioners consistently had the highest poverty figures (Milanovic, 1992). In
1993, farmers have the highest poverty incidence (23 percent) among groups with an active
connection to the labor market, followed by the mixed households (19 percent). The situation
of mixed households is also a reversal relative to the pre-transition period, when they usually
had the lowest poverty incidence.
Table 4. Poverty  incidene and pverty gap by socio-economic  group.
Below miniMum  pension  Below minimum wage
________________________  (1,231,300 zL)  (1,500,000  zL)
Poverty  Poverty gap  Poverty  Poverty gap
Icidence  incid  ene
Worker  11.0  11.8  21.6  14.3
Fa|  mer  23.3  13.7  38.6  16.8
Woer-fiarmr  19.0  10.0  38.2  13.4
Pensioner  10.9  13.8  21.2  16.0
Slf-mployed  9.0  11.1  18.4  13.5
Social inme  ecint  55.9  17.9  71.3  23.0
All  14.4  13.2  26.3  15.6
Note:  Povety incidence  is the pa:etWg  of people  below the povety liUn;  poveity  ap i  tde avmgo *ozi1  of houehold expaxdiu
per equgvalet  adulk  a  percatge  of the povet  line
20.  The po'venIy gap  (the average shortfall of household expenditures relative to  the
poverty line) is quite low in Poland: 15.6 percent of the minimum wage and 13.2 percent of the- 12 -
miniimum  pension 4 (Table 4). This means that the average person with a level of living below
the minimum  wage has a shortfall  of about 234,000 zi. per month ($13.5), and the average
person below the mnmum  pension has a shortfall  of about 160,000  zl. ($9). It is also quite
remarkable  that the variation  of the poverty  gap across socio-economic  groups is very slight.
Excluding  the social  income  recipients,  the poverty  gap ranges  only between  13 percent and 17
percent of the minimum  wage, and 10 percent and 14 percent of the minimum  pension. There
is thus no one group  in Poland  which falls significantly  behind  others. The exception  of course
are the social  income  recipients.  Although  they constitute  only between  dtree and four percent
of the population,  they constitute  13 percent  of all poor. Their  poverty  is also much  deeper,  with
a poverty  gap of 18 percent  of the minimum  pension  and 23 percent  of the minimum  wage. This
means tha  the average expenditure  per equivalent adult in poor  social income recipient
households  lies only between 1,000,000 and 1,266,000 zl. per month ($58-73).  While, by
definition,  this group is covered  by the social safety net, the transfers they now receive are
inadequate  to give them a level of living  in line with the other groups, and even in line with
other  poor. Section  4 will examine  in detail  the transfers they receive  and the contribution  each
transfer makes.
21.  The fact that the povety gap is fairly small  and even  across socio-onomic  groups
indicates  that the social safety net in Poland functions  well enough  to prevent any one group
4. This  poverty  gap  is very  low  by intemational  standards,  although  not  unwually  low  for Eastem  Europe  (e.g.
in Hunguy  it is estiuaed at 17  peent  for  a poverty  line aqual  to half GNP/capita).  Most  West-European  countries
have  poverty  gaps n  the 30-40  pent  range.  In coutries  with high inequality,  such  as  Brazil,  the  poverty  gap can
exceed 50 percent.- 13  -
from faling very much  below  the poverty  line regardless  of the cause of poverty.  This is also
very  important  for furither  targeing  of poverty  alleviation  measures.  In essence,  the  even  poverty
gap means  that  resources  can  be targeted  mainly  on the basis  of differences  in poverty  incidence,
even  if the objeetive  is to reduce  both  poverty  incidence  and the severity  of poverty.  In contast,
in a situation  where the poverty  gap varies across  socio-economic  groups, it can  be shown  that
resources  should  be targeted  according  to the product  of the poverty incidence  ratio and the
poverty  gap ratio (see  e.g. Grootaert  and Kanbur,  1990,  and Kanbur,  1987).  The  later situation
is of course relevant  for the social  income  recipients  households,  who should  receive  a larger
share  of resources  than suggested  by the poverty  incidence  only,  in view of their  larger  poverty
gap.
22.  In order  to assess  the amount  of resources  needed  to alleviate  poverty,  one needs  to
combine  poverty  incidence  with the absolute  size of each socio-economic  group and with the
poverty  gap. Since  workers  and pensioners  are the two largest  groups  in Poland,  they make  up
over 50 percent of all poor, even  though they have a low poverty incidence  (Table  5). Any
attempt  to help the poor in those  groups  will thus have  to rely on means-testing,  since  targeting
based only on the socio-economic  criterion  will lead to high leakage  of resources  to the non-
poor.- 14-
Table S. Distribution of the poor by sacio-oonomic group.
Below minimum  penuion  Below minimum  wage  Shar of each aocio-
(1,231,300 zl.)  (1,S00,000 zl.)  economic  goup in
l  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  total  population
Worker  37.9%  40.7%  49.4%
Fanmer  17.1%  15.6%  10.6%
Work-famer  11.5%  12.7%  8.7%
Penuioner  16.9%  18.1%  22.4%
Self-employed  3.5%  3.9%  5.6%
Socialin  come repient  13.0%  9.1%  3.3%
Totl  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%
23.  The regional vwaion  in poverty incidence (rable 6) is less pronounced than across
socio-conomic  groups. The Warsaw-region has the lowest poverty incidence, followed by the
South. The highest poverty incidence is in the South-East and Central-West. Together those two
regions comprise 30 percent of all poor. In the South-East poverty is especially concentrated
among farmers and social income recipients. The poverty gap vanes very little across regions,
confirming that no one region as a whole constitutes an area of severe poverty. This finding is
perhaps surprising given that different regions in Poland have been affected very differently by
economic transition. This could well be a testimony to the well-functioning of the safety net,
which, especially through unemployment benefits and pensions, has been able to compensate
people to a large degree for the costs of trnsition,  and has effectively prevented that a large
number of them fall into poverty.- 1S  -
Table 6. Poverty incidence and poverty gap by rtgion
Bdow ininmuM pmagon  Below ninimm  wagp
(1,231,300  71.)  (1,S00,000 zl.)
Pove"r  Poverty gp  Povty  Poverqy  gap
Incidence  incidance
Cntatnl-capital  9.6  12.5  18.9  14.8
Contral  11.2  13.4  23.7  14.4
Central-East  16.S  12.7  30.7  15.3
Centil-Wst  17.0  12.9  29.4  16.0
North  14.1  14.2  26.3  16.0
North-East  1S.3  13.1  28.2  15.3
South  10.9  13.8  19.4  16.0
South-East  18.4  13.0  33.1  15.7
South-West  16.8  14.3  29.6  16.6
All  14.4  13.2  26.3  15.6
Note:  Povewy  incidenc.  is the peemge  of people  below  the poverty  le;  poverty  gap  lsthe  Avenge  shonril of houmehold  expendltui
per cqivaln  adul u  percege  of the  povey  lim.
Table 7. Distribution of the poor by regon.
Below  Tmnaimum  pension  Below  minimMum  Sharm  of each region
(1,231,300 zl.)  waep  (1,500,000 z1.)  in total  pbtuIation
Central-capital  7.9%  8.5 %  11.8%
Central  6.6%  7.7%  8.5%
Cntaml-East  6.5%  6.6%  5.7%
Central-West  17.4%  16.5%  14.7%
North  9.7%  9.9%  9.9%
North-East  6.4%  6.5%  6.0%
South  13.1%  12.8%  17.3%
South-East  20.2%  19.9%  15.8%
South-West  12.1%  11.7%  10.4%
ALU  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%
24.  All this does  not mean that  there are no voivodships  which  are significantly  worse  off
(or better  off) than the region  to which they belong. Although  the 1993  budget survey  does not- 16  -
provide representative  data at the voivodship  level, the data do show significant  variation  in
poverty incidence  within  certain regions:
*  The Cental-capital region has the lowest poverty incidence at 9.6 percent, but
voivodsip  Ostroleckie  has a poverty incidence twice as high, especially  among
farmers; similarly,  in the Central  region, with an overall  poverty incidence  at 11.2
percent, voivodship  Sieradzkie  shows  a very high percentage  of poor social  income
recipients;
*  the Central-East  region incudes  relatively  well-off  voivodship  Chelmslde,  but it also
includes  voivodships  Bialskopodlaslke  and Zamojslie which Are  among  the poorest
in the country;
*  the low-poverty  South  region  contains  voivodship  Bielskie  where about one in four
people  are poor;
*  while it  is  one  of  the  poorer regions, the South-West contains voivodships
Walbrzyslie  and Wroclawskie  (both  of which  border  the South  region)  with a poverty
level only about half that of the region as a whole.
25.  There is a further spatia dinension to poverty:  poverty  incidence  is much  higher  in
villages and in small cities than in large cities (Table  8). In large cities (more than 200,000- 17  -
inhabitants),  only 5.5 percent of people live below the minimum  pension. This percentage
uniformly  rises  with smaLer  city size, and reaches  22 percent  in villages.  A similar  pattern  exists
relative to the minimum  wage. Once again though, the poverty gap is remarkably  even. Even
though  the poverty  rate in villages  is more than three times  what it is in large cities, the poverty
gap is a mere four percentage  points higher.
Table 8. Poverty incidence and poverty gap by  typ  of locality.
Below mi_  num  pesion  Below mininum wae  Shae in total
l_________________  (1,231,300  zl.)  (1,500,000  zL)  population
Cities  Povery  Povety  gap  Povrty  Poverty gap
lIcidence  incidence
>200,000  inhabitants  5.5  12.7  12.3  13.0  21.7%
100-200,00  inhabitants  7.9  15.2  16.3  15.3  8.4%
20-100,000 inhabitans  11.4  13.2  21.6  15.7  18.7%
<20,000  14.2  12.7  27.1  15.5  12.3%
Villages  22.1  13.1  38.1  16.3  38.9%
All  14.4  13.2  26.3  15.6  100.0%
Note:  Poverty  incideac  is the pexcentage  of poole bedow  th  poverty  line; poverty  gap is the  ragc shoriifl of household  expendituri
per equivolt  adult  a pceap  of tde pvevty line.
26.  Demographic  charactenstics  are important  mdicators  of poverty  in Poland.  This is
especially  the case for type of household  (Table  9). Only 3.4 percent  of childless  couples  live
below the minimum  pension level - many of these households  are pensioners.  The poverty
incidence  rises steadily with the number of children. Among households  with four or more
children, 42.6 percent have an expenditure  level per equivalent  adult below the mmum
pension, and 60.8 percent fall below the minimum  wage. One corollary  of these observations- 18 -
Table 9. Povety  incidence and povety  gap by qpe  of household and gender.
Below m*n=mum  pension  Below minimum wage  Share in
(1,231,300  zl.)  (1,500,000 i1.)  population
povert  poverty gap  Poverty  Povety  gap
Incidence  icidence
Couple  3.4  11.7  9.0  13.3  11.6%
Couple +1 child  6.1  13.1  14.6  13.7  10.9%
Couple +2  chidrn  11.7  11.1  23.1  14.3  20.8%
Couple +3  chldren  22.9  12.7  40.0  15.3  9.0%
Couple +4  or more children  42.6  14.8  60.8  18.4  5.0%
Father  + children  9.7  18.6  15.4  20.8  0.3%
Mother +  cbildrenL  16.4  14.6  28.5  17.2  3.2%
Other  15.6  13.5  28.6  16.1  39.4%
Male-headed households  14.0  12.9  26.3  15.2  72.9%
Female-headed  households  15.3  13.7  26.1  16.9  27.1%
Males  14.6  13.7  26.9  16.0  47.9%
Femles  14.1  12.8  25.7  15.2  52.1%
All  14.4  13.2  26.3  15.6  100.0%
NOW:  Poverty inridece o the  pacenge  of people  beldo the poverty line; povety gap is the avetage shoufal of houewhold  expenditure
per  equivalent  wAdt  pecnuzae of the pov  line.
is that  povely  mong chdren  in Poland is high; one in five children lives in a household with
an expenaditure  level below the minimum  pension (Table 10). In contrast, thepovefry rae among
elderly  people (60+ years of age) is only 7.6 pernt  - one half the national average (Table 10).
The strong couelation between poverty and presence of children in the household, makes the
presence of children an important candidate for the targeting of socal transfers. Currently, only
the family allowance  and materity  care are based on this criterion. By the same token, the
social safety net seems quite effecive  at protecting elderly people against poverty and further
old-age-based interventions do not appear wanranted at this time.- 19  -
Table 10. Poverty  ams g children ad  elderly.
Percent  liviDg in poor households
(Below mi=:im  pensina - 1,231,300  l.)
____________________  Childr  Elderly (60+)
Worker  14.5  5.1
Fanmer  27.5  18.7
Worker-fiwmer  21.8  14.0
Penaoner  33.1  5.5
Self-employed  10.8  7.3
Social income  recipient  60.0  43.1
All  20.3  7.6
All households  14.4  14.4
27.  At fit  sight, there does not appear  to be an important  gender  dinension  to poverty
in Poland (Table  9). Poverty incidence  among  men and women  is almost  the same, and this is
also the case among  male-headed  and female-headed  households.  C(his  could well be because
in the survey  data the main earer  in the household  is automatically  classified  as the head of
household.)  However, among single-parent  households, the poverty incidence  is higher for
mothers  with children  than for fathers with children. (TIs  comparison  has to be treated with
caution since  there are very few cases of fathers vith children  in the sample.)  These  aggregate
figures  could of course  hide many  different  situations  faced  by women  with respect  to access  to
the labor market  or extent  of coverage  by the social  safety  net. Nead (1994)  contains  an in-depth
inquiry of the gender dimension  of poverty, and Vial (1994)  focuses on the social  assistance
aspects.- 20 -
28.  We close this brief overview  of the poverty  profile  in Poland,  by looldng  at the link
between education and peveny. There is a strong inverse  relation between  povery and the
education  of the head of household  (rable 11). Post-secondary  education  virtually  guarantees  a
level of living  above  the poverty  line. Even in households  where the head  has completed  general
secondary  education,  the poverty  rate is only 7.8 percent.  But  poverty  incidence  is twice  as high
or  more if  the head only has vocational or  elementary education. This is  an important
observation  because almost  two thirds of the Polish population  lives in households  where the
head has only vocational  or elementary  education.
Table 11. Poverty and education.
Below  min_imu  pension  Share  in total
(1,231,300  zi)  populanon
Educatio of head of household  Poverty incidence  Poverty gap 
Elementary  22.1  14.3  28.6%
Vocational  16.6  12.4  35.3%
Secondary  7.8  12.6  25.4%
Higher  2.0  10.2  10.6%
All  14.4  13.2  100.0%
Note:  Poveat incidence  is the peentage  of people  below  the poverty  line:  poverty  Zap  in  die  avenge shotas&  of houwhold  expenditutc
per equaivaent  adult  a  peeemag  tho  povety line.
29.  We can sunmarize the povety profile in Poland as  follows. Poverty  in Poland  has
a strong socio-economic,  locational,  and demographic  dimension.  Poverty  rates are low among
workers, pensioners,  the elderly  in general, among  the educated,  and in large cites. Poverty  is
high among  farmers, in rural areas in general,  among  workers  with low education,  and among
households  with many  children.  Since  transition,  two new  socio-economic  groups  have  emerged:-21  -
a successful  cls  of self-employed  people, with the highest  expenditre level and the lowest
poverty  of any group, and a clss  of households  who must rely on the non-pension  part of the
social  safety  net as main  source  of income,  and of whom  more than half live in poverty.
30.  The poverty  gap is not very large in Poland  and is extremely  even  across  all groups
and regions.  This points  at a sgificant degree  of success  of the social  safety  net in preventing
pockets of deep poverty. (The sole exception  is the new group  of social  income recipients.)
However,  there remains  scope  for improved  targeting  of the different  components  of the social
safety  net.
IV.  Poverty and Unemployment
31.  Unemployment is perhaps the most visible social  ill resulting  from transition  - it
affected  over 15  percent  of the labor  force  in 1993.  Unemployment  is a major  cause  of poverty
in Poland.  The poverty rate among  households  where there is at least one unemployed  person
is 27.8 percent  - almost  twice  the national  averge  (Table  12). The impact  is especially  sharp
among  worker and pensioner  households.  The impact is also disproportionately  felt by blue
collar  workers,  who make  up almost  60 percent  of all unemployed,  and by those  with  low  levels
of education  (Table 13).-22  -
Table 12. Poverty and umploym
Blow  minimum  pension
(1,231,300 zL)
Households  with one or  All housholds
mote unemployed  members
Poverty  Poverty gap  Poverty  Poverty gap
Incidence  incidence
Worker  20.4  12.7  11.0  11.8
Famer  29.7  12.5  23.3  13.7
Worer-fianer  26.1  12.6  19.0  10.0
Pensioner  27.4  15.3  10.9  13.8
Self-employed  14.5  9.0  9.0  11.1
Soial  income  recipilent  56.7  17.1  55.9  17.9
All  27.8  14.4  14.4  13.2
Note:  Pavety incidelce  a tlhe  paccag  of peopl below  he pavesty  rne; pove  gap s the  aveg ditffi  of houwod  expendite
per  equivalent  adult  as peenta  of the povety line.
Table 13. Characteistics of the unemployed (3rd quarter 1993).
Percentage of all unemployed
Women  53.3
Men  46.7
Blue collar wokers  58.9
White collar workers  16.9
Recent graduates  8.3
Other  15.0
With  umiversity diploma  1.9
WVAh  secondary  vocational  diploma  21.0
With secondary  diploma  7.2
With primary vocational diploma  39.0
With pim:uy diploma  30.9
15-17  years  0.7
18-24 years  35.3
25-34 years  28.1
35-44 years  24.5
45-54 years  9.5
55+  years  1.9
Source. Ministry  of Iabor itabua-23 -
32.  The extent to which unemployment  contnbutes  to poverty differs for each soci-
economic  group (Figure 1). For each of the four traditional  groups, the unemployed  represent
a poverty  incidence  of about  four  percentage  points.  This corresponds  of course  to very different
relative  sbares:  for worker  and pensioner  households,  poverty  due to unemployment  is over  one
third of all poverty, while  for farmers  it is only 15 percent.  In contrast,  poverty  among  children
is a much  greater contributing  factor  for farmer  and mixed  households  than  in other groups.  The
situation  of the two post-transition  socio-economic  groups  presents  two extremes.  For the self-
employed,  unemployment  is a minor cause of poverty, while for the social  income recipients
unemployment  is a cause for 80 percent of all poor.
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33.  In Figure 2, regions  are ordered by incidence  of poverty. For the five regions with
the lowest poverty incidence  (Central-Capital,  South, Cental,  North, and North-East),  the
differences in  poverty are  almost entrely  explained by  differences in  poverty due  to
unemployment.  In the Warsaw-region,  poverty due to unemployment  is 24 prcent of the total,
while in the North-East  it is 50 percent.  These differences  are pardy but not entirely  explned
by differences  in the unemployment  rate (see  Table 14). The situation  is different  in the Central-
East and Central-West  regions who each have an unusually  large share of poverty among
children and a low share of poverty due to unemployment.  In the remaining  two
Figure 2. Strcture  of poverty by region (poverty incidence %).
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Table 14. Regional  distribution  of unemployment.
Share  of  Shas  Sbare  of  Unmployment  Unempoyment  Povaty incidwen
populaion  of poor  unmployed  rste  re  (r_gite  among  households
only)  with unempbyed
l  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  p  crso  n
Ccnrlicapika  11.8%  7.9%  8.3%  8.7%  8.5%  18.2%
Cacul  8.5%  6.6%  11.1%  15.4%  15.1%  19.1%
Centra-East  5.7%  6.5%  4.1%  9.5%  9.0%  22.0%
CerIal-West  14.7%  17.4%  13.8%  12.3S%  11.8%  29.4%
North  9.9%  9.7%  11.7%  15.5%  14.9%  27.3%
North-East  6.0%  6.4%  8.6%  18.9%  18.6%  29.4%
South  17.3%  13.1%  11.2%  8.8%  8.2%  28.0%
South-East  15.5%  20.2%  16.5%  13.4%  12.5%  33.2%
South-West  10.4%  12.1%  14.6%  18.9%  17.9%  31.8%
Total  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  13.0%  12.4%*  27.8%
-ris  unemloymes  is  sighty lawer  th  the offlicid'  figue. This  is due to samping  emx in he  mcy  sulb  and minr defiiional
diffexeces.
regionis,  South-West  and South-East,  poverty  due to unemployment  is at about the same  level
as in the North-East.  The main difference  is  at the South-East  has a very high share of
poverty among the elderly. Both regions have a very high poverty incidence  among the
unemployed,  but only the South-West  has  high unemployment  (in  fact,  the highest  in the country
- Table 14).
34.  With  respect  to type  of  localiy,  the  relative  role  of  unemployment  in  explaining
poverty  is least  in big cities  and viLlages:  in each, about  30 percent  of the poor are in households
with an unemployed  member  (Figure  3). In the three intermediate  city sizes,  the figure  is just
over 40 percnt  In villages, the poverty among children  and the elderly is a much larger
proportion  of total poverty  (22 percent  and six percent,  respectively)  than elsewhere.- 26 -
Figure 3. Structre of poverty  by locality  (povty  incidee  %.
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35.  As we saw in the previous  section, the sharpest  increases  in povert incidence  are
observed  when  household  are ranked  according  to the number of children  or according  to the
education  level of the head of household.  The relative importance  of unemployment  as a
contributing  factor  to poverty,  does  not however  differ much  by household  siz  - it is steady  at
around  one thiird  (Figure  4). Obviously,  poverty  among children  rises with household  siz  and
this explains  most of the variation  in total  poverty  incidence  across  household  sizes.-27  -
Figlur 4. Strucue of poverty  by typo  of household  (poverq  incidence  X).
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36.  The relative  importance  of unemployment  as a determinant  of poverty  is also  fairly
steady across households  clssified  by the level of education  of the household  head: it
contributes  35 percent to poverty in households  where the head has elementary  or vocational
education,  and 39 percent where the head has secondary  education  (the figure is lower, 23
percent for heads  with higher  education,  but poverty  incidence  among  such  households  is very
low). The share  of children  in poverty  is markedly  lower  among  households  where  the head  only
has elementary  education  and the share of the eiderly  markedly  higher (Figure  5).- 28 -
Figure  5. Stctro  of povety by  ducation  of housubold  head (poverty  incidence  %).
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37.  In summay,  unemployment is a major cause of poverty in Poland. Over one third
of all poor live in households  where there is an unemployed member, and the poverty incidence
among people in such households  is almost twice the national average. The link between poverty
and unemployment varies across socio-conomic  groups and regions. The link is strongest in
worker and pensioner households, and in social income recipients households, where 80 percnt
of poverty is linked to unemployment. However,  it is the regional structure of poverty which
has the most pronounced link with unemployment. In the five regions with the lowest poverty
incidence, the structure of poverty is virtally  the same, save for poverty due to unemployment.- 29 -
In the other four regions, differences  in poverty among  children  and the elderly explain most
of the differences  in total poverty.
38.  The strong link between  poverty and unemployment  indicates  that pro-active  labor
market  policies  aimed at employment  creation need to be an important  ingredient  of poverty
afleviation  policy in Poland.  These  can run the entire gamut  from improved  employment  offices
to public  works,  credit-support  to small  enterprises,  and, of course, training  and re-training  (see
Rutlowsld, 1994 for details).  Where these policies are geared in the first place to providing
work to the unemployed, they will have the most immediate  poverty alleviation impact.
However,  the link  between  poverty  and education  suggests  that improved  training  and education
deserves  an important  role in poverty  alleviation  for the medium  longer  term. (It is outside  the
mandate  of this paper to develop  concrete  policy suggestions  in this area.)
V.  The BenefiLciaries  of the Social Safety Net
39.  For this study we have distinguished  five  components of the social stfely  net:
pensions, unemployment  benefits, fimily  allowances, other social insurance, and  social
assistance  (see section 1). Each of those has a set of specific  objectives  and attempts  to reach
different  households.  It is not surprising  therefore that the percentage  of households  receiving
a given transfer varics widely across the socio-economic  groups (Table 15). All pensioner
households  of course receive pensions, but  so do over 50 percent of  fanner and mixed
households  and about  one fourth  of worker  households.  The receipt  of pensions  in non-pensioner- 30 -
households arises because of the possibility of retirement by one household member while the
main earner continues to work.
Table 1S. Recipients of social transfs.
Percent  of households  receiving
Pension  Uncmploy.  Fanily  Other  Social
beneft  Allowuae  social  assistance
iunce
Households  below  minimum  pension  40.9  19.2  64.1  7.1  9.6
Households  betwen mizimum  pesion
and minimum  wiage  49.6  15.8  61.5  5.6  6.0
Houscholds  above  mininum  wage  54.9  7.2  46.6  2.5  2.5
Worker  23.5  9.9  71.1  4.0  3.2
Farmer  51.4  8.3  28.0  3.1  2.7
Worker-famner  53.8  9.5  67.1  6.6  2.7
Pensioner  99.9  4.7  23.2  1.0  2.3
Sclf-employed  19.2  6.1  61.6  3.1  0.8
Social  income  recipient  3.9  56.6  56.3  12.1  29.2
Cental-capital  50.2  6.5  41.7  2.5  2.8
Ccntml  51.9  11.5  45.3  4.0  4.9
Central-East  57.0  6.4  45.3  2.7  3.7
Ccntral-Wcst  52.2  9.6  53.8  4.0  4.0
North  46.2  11.9  53.6  3.2  3.S
North-East  55.1  13.5  49.2  3.7  4.5
South  S0.1  6.0  51.9  2.4  2.9
South-East  61.8  9.4  52.8  3.7  3.3
South-West  54.0  12.7  50.8  3.6  3.7
City
>200,000 inhabitants  50.3  5.7  47.2  2.7  3.6
100-200,000  inhabitants  48.6  7.6  50.5  2.9  3.2
20-100,000 inhabitants  47.9  9.4  54.7  2.6  3.7
<220,000  inhabitants  53.5  12.5  54.0  3.0  3.4
Villagcs  58.9  11.6  47.5  4.3  3.7
Couple  -S.3  3.1  12.8  0.3  0.9
Couple + 1 child  23.1  9.2  82.6  4.2  2.9
Couple +2 children  10.7  10.0  90.5  4.9  2.4
Couplb +3 children  11.8  12.2  83.1  6.7  4.8
Couple +4 or more children  10.0  13.2  88.5  9.7  9.7
Father +  childrn  50.7  7.5  52.3  0.0  9.2
Mother +  childrn  35.1  6.7  77.8  4.1  163
Other  75.9  11.4  31.7  2.8  3.7
AR  s2.9  9.3  49.9  3.3  3.6-31  -
40.  The second  most commonly  received social  transfer, by 50 percent of households,
is the family allowance  Cmcluding  allowance  for elderly  care). Around two thirds of worker,
mixed,  and self-employed  households  receive  it. Effective  coverage  of households  with  children
is very good, reaching almost 90  percent. Coverage however is  lower in  single-parent
households  with children  (about  75 percent). In farmer  households  coverage  is only 28 percent
because the family allowance is income-ested for these households. Other fonms  of  social
inswunce  (mainly matemity and childcare benefits) are only received by 3.3 percent of
households.
41.  Unemployment  benefits are received by 9.3 percent of households,  fairly evenly
distributed  over the three main socio-economic  groups.  However,  56.6  percent of social  income
recipient  households  receive  unemployment  benefits.  This is actually  a low percentage,  since
over 70 percent of all households  in this category  contain  an unemployed  person. This indicates
a concentatin  of unemployed  who no longer receive  benefits  in this group. Unemployment
benefits  are received  to a significntly higher degree  in smal cities  and villages  (where  indeed
55 percent of the unemployed  are located).
42.  Lastly, social  anistance is received by 3.6 percent  of all households.  It is received
fairly  equally  by the different  socio-econonic  groups,  except  for the two post-transition  groups.
Less than  one percet  of self-employed  households  benefit  from social  assistance  but 29 percent
of social  income  recipient  households  receive it. There are virtually  no differnnces  by city-size
and only minor regional differences.  The lowest percentage  of households  receiving social- 32  -
assistance  is in the Central-Capital  region and the South-East  - the two least-poor  regions in
Poland. Social assistance  is granted according to both an income-criterion  and a criterion  of
dysfunction  in the lhousehold.  This is reflected  in the beneficiary  percentages  by household  type:
the incidence  of receipt of social  assistance  rises with number  of children  in the households  (in
the same ways as does the incidence  of poverty)  and is highest  in single-parent  households.
43.  How weU targeted are these social tbnfers  to the poor? Forty-one percent of
households  below the minimum  pension  receive a pension, against  55 percent of households
above the minimum  wage. The average  pension received  by poor households  is 1,851,900  zl.
per month (Table 16), which  is well above  the minimum  pension  and the minimum  wage, but
this amount  contributes  of course  to the expenditure  of the entire household  and is not sufFicient
to raise every recipient  households  above  the poverty line on a per equivalent  adult basis. In
contrast, the average pension received by  the non-poor is  3,080,900 zl.  Thus,  a higher
percentage of non-poor receive pensions, and the amount they receive is also larger. The
concentration  coefficient  of pensions  is +0.21, which is only slightly  less than the Gini-
coefficient  of household  extpenditure  (0.26) and which  indicates  that pensions  contribute  only a
little to equlizing the distribution  of the standard  of living.- 33 -
Table 16. Aveag  amount of social  unsers  ('000 zl. per month) received by recipient bouseholds.
Pension  Uneploy.  Family  Other  Social
benefit  Allowance  social  asstance
_  mEuz~inceI
Households below min_im  pension  1,851.9  1,403.6  498.3  860.7  914.2
Households between m iniu
pension and minimum  wage  2,159.8  1.290.4  425.9  920.6  933.0
Households above mnimum wage
3,080.9  1.315.1  347.9  1,341.9  952.8
Work3er  2,105.1  1,290.7  363.9  1,062.4  890.7
Farmer  2,008.4  1,329.6  501.7  1,281.6  694.4
Worker-firmer  2,103.0  1,297.5  455.5  1,417.7  765.1
Pensioner  3,337.4  1,246.5  345.5  1,557.5  908.8
Self-employed  2,107.5  1,218.6  378.8  1,051.0  680.7
Social income recpient  1,234.2  1,520.8  434.6  972.5  1,128.2
Cenul-calpital  2,968.6  1,304.1  362.1  1,189.0  1,126.7
Cantrl  2,794.6  1,419.5  343.1  1,212.6  982.7
Centrl-East  2,702.1  1,282.3  429.1  1,211.0  975.9
Central-West  2,786.7  1,383.5  394.1  1,367.9  995.5
North  2,844.9  1,385.3  373.5  1,262.4  981.3
North-East  2,632.0  1,412.9  392.9  1,146.2  894.9
South  3,278.3  1,206.1  356.3  984.6  835.1
South-Fagt  2,747.6  1,264.8  411.5  1,046.4  934.6
South-West  2,932.1  1,305.6  361.5  1,049.3  757.4
2,894.6  1,330.0  377.8  1,160.1  938.6
44.  Unemwloyment  betefFts are much more targeted to the poor: 19.2 percent of poor
households receive dtem, against only 7.2 percent of non-poor households. The average monthly
benefit is 1,330,000 zl. and does not differ by income-level of the recipient. This means that on
balance unemployment benefits contribute to eq'alizing  the distribution of income (as reflected
by a concentration coefficient of -0.29, which implies both an absolute and relative reduction
in inequality).- 34 -
45.  There is a distinct regional patter  in the receipt of unemployment  benefits. The
percentage  of households  receiving  unemployment  benefits  vanes between  six  percent (South  -
one of the least poor regions,  with low unemployment)  and 13.5 percent (North-East  - a high
unemployment  region). In general, the incidence  of the beneficiaries  of unemployment  benefits
follows  closely  the unemployment  rate which means  that  the regional  distribution  of unemployed
people without benefits is quite even (Table 17). In  most regions, 30-33 percent of  the
unemployed  receive  no benefits.  In the South-East  and Central-East  regions the figure  is about
40 percent though,  while in the North only 27 percent  of the unemployed  receive  no benefits.
46.  Pmnily allowances are also proportionately more received by poor households, but
to a lesser degree than unemployment  benefits: 64.1 pect  of poor households  receive the
allowances against 46.6 percent of  non-poor households.  The amount received by poor
households  (498,300  zI. per month)  is also 40 percent of higher than that received  by non-poor
households  (mainly  because  poor households  have  more  children).  The concentration  coefficient
of the family  allowance  is negative  (-0.12), suggesting  that it reduces  inequality  in an absolute
as well as relative  way, but to a lesser degree than unemployment  benefits.- 35 -
Table 17. Regional  distibution of imeloyment
Unemployment  rate  %  of households  %  of unemployed
(registered  only)  receiving uneloyment  witiout benefits
benefits
Centmi-Capidl  8.5% (2)  6.5% (3)  33%
Cental  15.1% (7)  11.5% (6)  33%
Central-East  9.0% (3)  6.4% (2)  43%
Central-West  11.8% (4)  9.6% (5)  30%
North  14.9% (6)  11.9% C7)  27%
North-East  18.6% (9)  13.5% (9)  32%
South  8.2% (1)  6.0% (1)  31%
South-East  12.5% (5)  9.4% (4)  40%
lSouth-West  17.9% (8)  12.7% (8)  32%
All  12.4%  9.3%  33%
Noe:  Rank of tbe =ion  is in parandesbi.
47.  Other  socia insurnce  (maternty  and childcare)  are only  rcceived  by a small  number
of households,  but  ree times  more  frequently  by poor than  non-poor  households.  This targetng
is offset though  by the fact that the amounts  received  by non-poor  households  are much  larger
than those  received  by the poor. The concentration  coefficient  of other social  insurance  is -0.01.
48.  Socil  asACe  is well targeted towards the poor: 9.6 percent of households  below
the minimum  pension benefit from social assistance,  against only 2.5 percent of households
above the minimum  wage. This ratio of almost 4:1 is the best of any component  of the social
safety net. It stands to reason that the income-testing  of social assistance  contnrbutes  to this.
However,  the amounts  received  are slightly  higher for non-poor  recipients.  On average,  farmer
households  receimve  the least amount  of socal assistance  and social  income  recipient  households
the most. The amounts  do not differ much across regions,  except  in the Central-Capital  region- 36 -
where they are well above average, and in the South and South-West  where they are below
average. The concentration  coefficient  of social  assistance  payments  is
-0.29, the same  as for unemployment  benefits.
49.  From the point of view of social welfre,  it is important  to look at the overa
allocation of  socil  transfers  - which combines the  incidence of  benefiiaries  over  social
categories  and regions,  and the average  amounts  received  by the beneficiaries.  This will indicate
the contribution  made  by each social  transfer  to the level of living  of the households  in a certain
group or region, and may suggest  possibilities  for reallocation.
50.  Tables 15 and 16 showed  respectively  the incidence  of recipients  and the amounts
reeved.  Tables 18 and 19 combine  this information  to show  respectively  the average  amount
of a given  transfer  per household,  i.e. recipient  and non-recipient,  and the relative contribution
this makes  to covering  the expenditure  of the households  in question.  The social safety net in
Poland  represents  44.9  percent of the expenditure  of an average  household. Pensions  are the
lion's share (80 percent) of this, and by tlemselves contribute  36.5 percent to household
expenditure.  Unemployment  benefits  represent  three percent of household  expenditure  and all
other non-pension  benefits  5.5 percent- 37 -
Table 18. Averge  amount of social btrsfers  ('000 zl. per month) per household (icipients  and non-recipients).
Pe-sion  Unemploy. I  Family  Other  Social
benefit  Allowance  social  assistance
______  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~insunmce
Households below minimnm pensio  758.1  268.8  319.5  61.0  87.7
Euseholds  betweem  ini
penion  and miniMun wage  1,072.3  204.3  261.7  51.9  55.5
Households above minimum  wage
1,692.1  94.7  162.2  33.3  23.6
Worker  493.6  127.3  258.7  42.8  28.3
Farmer  1,032.8  110.5  140.6  39.5  18.9
Worker-famner  1,132.2  123.0  305.7  93.9  20.8
Pendsioer  3,334.8  59.0  80.2  15.4  21.3
Self.enployed  404.1  74.4  233.2  32.7  5.5
Social  ncome  recipint  48.3  860.7  244.6  117.9  328.9
Central-capital  i,489.2  85.3  150.9  30.2  31.4
Central  1,449.5  163.3  155.3  48.5  48.5
Central-East  1,539.7  82.6  194.5  32.7  36.6
Central-West  1,454.3  133.2  211.9  54.7  39.9
North  1,315.3  165.1  200.3  40.9  34.3
North-East  1,450.9  190.8  193.3  42.0  40.4
South  1,641.7  72.2  184.8  23.8  24.5
South-East  1,697.0  119.0  217.2  38.5  31.1
South-West  1,583.3  165.5  183.7  38.2  27.8
All  1,532.0  123.9  188.7  38.0  33.5- 38  -
Table 19. Social transfers as percentage of household expenditure (all households).
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  C3)+(4)+(
Pension  Unempl.  Family  Other  Social  Total  5)
benefit  ALlow.  social  asist.
..  Imr
Households below m
penson  30.3  9.2  9.6  2.0  4.0  S.1  15.6
Householdsbetween minmu
pension andmininm  _  wa  36.9  5.5  6.3  1.2  1.7  51.6  9.2
Households above minimum  wage  37.2  1.8  2.7  0.5  0.5  42.7  3.7
WorlCer  8.2  2.6  4.8  0.8  0.6  16.9  6.2
Farmer  21.4  2.2  2.7  0.6  0.5  27.3  3.8
Workr-faimer  18.1  2.0  5.1  1.4  0.3  26.9  6.8
Pensioner  86.6  1.3  2.1  0.2  0.6  91.0  3.0
Self-enmdoyed  6.2  1.4  3.8  0.5  0.1  12.0  4.4
Social  income recipient  1.3  30.2  7.6  4.0  13.7  56.7  25.2
Central-capital  34.6  1.9  2.7  O.S  1.0  40.7  4.2
Centml  36.5  3.9  3.1  1.0  1.7  46.2  5.7
Centaml-East  37.0  1.8  3.7  0.5  1.1  44.0  5.3
Cental-West  34.4  3.0  4.5  1.0  1.2  44.0  6.6
North  32.2  4.2  4.1  0.7  1.0  42.2  5.8
North-East  36.1  4.5  3.8  0.8  1.1  46.3  5.7
Soudt  38.2  1.8  3.6  0.5  0.8  44.8  4.8
South-East  38.9  2.6  4.3  0.8  0.8  47.4  5.9
South-West  38.9  4.1  4.0  0.9  0.8  48.6  5.6
All  36.5  2.9  3.8  0.7  1.0  44.9  5.5
51.  There  are of course  large differences  in the relave  importance  of te  social  transfers
for the different socio-economic  groups. E.g.,  pensions covers 86.6 peroent of  household
expenditure  of pensioners,  but less than 10 percent of those  of workers  and the self-employed.
For the social income recipients, unemployment  benefits cover 30 percent of  household
expenditure,  and all other wansfers  add another 27 percent.- 39 -
52.  From the poverty  perspective,  the key question  is whether  the social safety  net covers
more of household  expenditure  for the poor than the non-poor.  This is one way of judging the
progressivity  of the system. In tota4 the socal  safety net is ndly  progressive, representing
55.1 percent  of average  expenditure  of households  below  the minimum  pension  and  42.7 percent
of expenditue of households  above  the minimum  wage (Table  19). However,  this is the sum  of
two very different effecs,  due to pensions and the other transfers. The share of household
expenditure  covered  by pensions is actually  lower for the poor than the non-poor. In contrast,
unemployment  benefits contribute 9.2 percent to the expenditure  of the poor and only 1.8
percent to the expenditure  of the non-poor  (a ratio of 5.1:1). The remaining  social transfers
make  up 15.6  percent  of the expenditure  of the poor against  3.7 percent  of those  of the non-poor
(a ratio of 4.2:1). The progressiviy of the social safety net in PoInnd  is thus entirely  due to
the non-pension  components,  especally the unemployment  benefits  and the family allowance
(Table  20).
Table 20. Poor-to-non-por  ratios of social tmsfers.
Penon  UnempL  Family  Other  Social
benefit  allowance  social  assisl
insurance 
Recipients (Table 15)  0.74  2.7  1.4  2.8  3.8
Amownt  per recipient housebold (Table 16)  0.60  1.1  1.4  0.6  1.0
Amont  per household (Table 18)  0.45  2.8  2.0  1.8  3.7
Shale Of  oushld  expenditure (Table 19)  0.81  5.1  3.6  4.0  8.0-40 -
VI.  Closing  the Poverty Gap
53.  The success  of a social  transfer  system  is not only measured  by the degree  to which
the benefits  ar  received  by the poor (see  previous section), but also by the extent to which  it
contributes  to closing  the poverty  gap. If the gap is completely  closed  for a household,  then the
socmil  transfer  system  has successfuly  lifed this household  out of poverty  by raising its mcome
level, and the expenditure  level made possible by this, from below to above the poverty
benchmark.  This is an important  element  of the extemal  efficiency  of the social  safety  net, but
of course not the only element. In other words, the ultimate objective  of a social safety net
should not be to lift all people out of poverty in all circumstances.  Apart from the fiscal
implications  of such  objective,  it would  have many undesirable  incentive  effects.  E.g. pensions
may well be set at a minmum level to guarantee  pensioners  a decent  level of living, but subject
to a certain  number  of years of work and contributions  to the system.  Without  such  condition,
a major incentive  for 'free riding" would  be created.
54.  The extent to which the social safety net reduces the poverty gap depends on the
extent to which transfers go to people or households  who are poor prior to the receipt of the
given benefit  and on the amount of the benefit in relation to the poverty  gap. We now look at
each of these  two elements  in turn. Table 21 shows the extent to which transfers are received
by households  who were poor before they received the transfer (ex-ante  targetng). Of all
transfers,  penons  go to the largest  degree  to households  who were poor  prior to the recept of
the pension. This is not surprising  since  pensions  are large absolute  amounts  and constitute  the- 41 -
major  income  source  for most  recipient  households.  Unemployment  benefits  and social  assistance
each go for more than 50 percent to households  who were poor before they receved these
benefits.  In contrast, only  20 percent of the recipients  of family  allowances  were poor pnor to
the receipt of the allowance.
55.  While these figures  indicate  a fair degree  of success  in ex-ante  targeting, they also
show that a substantial  degree of leakage occurs, i.e. the existence  of beneficiaries  of social
transfers who  were not poor before  tiey received  the trnsfer. Looking  at non-pension  transfers,
Table  21 indicates  that at least  one ftird of current  recipients  of social  transfers  in Poland  would
not be classifed as poor even before they received  the tmnsfer. l  the case of the family
allowance, the figure is two thirds. Table 22 indicates  the amounts  of money this represents:
from 31 percent to 60 percent of all transfers go to households  who were not poor  prior to the
receipt  of  fte  transfer.  7his  suggests  dtht  there  is  significant  room  in  the  system for
reallocation in favor  of the poor.
Table 21. Ex-ante  targeting of transfe  (households).
Households  below  Households betwoe  Households above  All
minimrml  pension  minimurm  pension  mimTnmm  wage
I___________________  _________________  and  minimu  wage  .
Pension  71.1%  7.7%  21.3%  100.0%
Unwploynent  benefit  51.89  14.2%  34.0%  100.0%
Family allowance  19.7%  12.7%  67.6%  100.0%
Odher  social ins  44.6%  18.8%  36.7%  100.0%
Socil  assistane  52.7%  10.7%  36.6%  100.0%-42  -
Table 22. Ex-anto  targeting  of tanhfor (amounts of money).
Households below  liouseholds between  Households above  Al
ninimum  pension  minimum  pension  minimum  wage
and  minimum  wage
Pendona  76.1%  6.0%  17.9%  100.0%
Unemployment benefit  54.6%  14.0%  31.4%  100.0%
Family allowance  26.4%  13.7%  59.8%  100.0%
Otber  social insurance  48.7%  16.3%  35.1%  100.0%
Social assistance  59.5%  9.1%  31.4%  100.0%
Total  74.4%  6.1%  19.5%  100.0%
56.  In pardcular, one can point at the family allowance  which has many non-poor
recipients. The share effectively  going to the poor could be enhanced  by income-testing  the
family  allowance  and/or  by taing  it as ordinary  income.  In the latter case, the progressivity  of
tax rates would ensure that in net terms a larger share of the allowance  goes to the poor. The
fact th  the allowance  has recently  been held steady  in nominal  terms  has also  affected  the  poor
proportionately  more. This  could  be addressed  by indexing  the allowance  to the rate of inflation.
The upper  age limit for  eligibility  of the family  allowance  (20  years) seems  excessively  generous
and a reduction  to 18 years  would free resources to pay in part for the indexation.
57.  Even though  social  assistance  is the best targeted  of all social  transfers,  it is intended
to be only available  to households  with incomes below the minimum  pension, and the figures
clearly show that in practice  this is not the case. While some social assistance  may well be
delivered  to dysfunctional  households  above the income benchmark,  there is clearly scope  to
improve  the income-testing  of social  assistance.  Moreover,  the amounts  paid out to better-off- 43 -
households  could be reduced  (since  now they are slightly  higher hn  those  going to the poor).
Vial (1994)  furtihr addresses  problems  in the delivery of social  assistance.
58.  After social assistance,  the unemployment  benefit is cunrently  the social safety  net
component  which  flows  to the highest  extent  to the poor. This may  call for some  reconsideration
of the eligibility  rules. Poverty  alleviaon is not an explicit  goal  of unemployment  compensaion,
but the link between poverty and unemployment  is so strong in Poland that unemployment
benefits  have a strong  poverty alleviation  effect. We do not advocate  to increase  the benefits,
in order to avoid  perverse  incentive  effects,  but it could be considered  to increase  the period of
eligibility  for selected  unemployed,  especially  people  with low levels  of education.  In the current
economic  situation,  they seem  to have the lowest  probability  to find a new  job. In the medium
term, this problem  must be addressed  by pro-active  labor market  policies  such as retraining,
employment  promotion,  etc. In the short term, the situation  of the low-skilled  unemployed  is
only bound to worsen  when their unemployment  benefits  run out. In order to limit the fiscal
impact, extension  of eligibility  can be limited to workers whose highest diploma  is primary
education  or vocational  school  (lower  levels only)  and those  who have ffiree  or more children.
This would be a more effective  targeting  method than e.g. the current system of extending
benefits  on a regional  basis.
59.  For those recipients of social transfers who are poor prior to the receipt of the
transfer, one can ask the question  how many of them are moved above  the poVertY  lime  as a
result of the transfer (Table  23). Because  pensions are by far the largest  component  of the safety- 44- 
net, it is not surprising  that they contribute  the most to keeping  people  out of poverty:  63 percent
of households  who receive  pensions  would  become  poor without  them.  The figure  is of course
higher for pensioners  (79 percent), but even among farmers and mixed households  over 40
percent of recipients  of pensions  would slide  below the poverty  line without  them. As we saw
before, the regional  distribution  of pensions  is quite even, but it needs to be pointed  out that in
villages  the poverty reducing  effect of pensions  is markedly  lower than in cities.- 45 -
Table 23. Povety  lliaon  impact of social trsfers.
Pernt  of recipient houmbo[ds  who would fall bdow the poverty
|______________  lino  (nimum  pension) if they  did not receive  social  trnsfer
Pension  Unemploy.  Family  Other  Social
benefit  allowance  social  assistance
inSUrance
Worker  28.5  27.8  5.2  19.9  17.0
Farmer  42.4  23.6  8.6  24.8  22.9
Worker-fmher  40.5  26.7  8.2  28.6  19.4
Pensioner  78.9  34.7  7.6  21.1  31.6
Self-employed  24.6  14.6  4.4  8.3  48.1
Social income recipient  36.5  37.6  12.8  27.3  29.5
Centml.capital  61.6  27.8  5.6  18.8  34.9
Central  64.8  34.4  5.1  25.6  30.5
Central-East  56.5  29.5  7.5  16.3  26.4
Central-West  63.9  32.6  7.5  28.1  23.5
North  65.9  29.2  6.5  26.0  27.0
North-East  61;7  31.4  6.1  24.6  26.1
South  66.7  23.6  4.3  13.2  18.4
South-East  58.5  30.4  7.3  22.4  16.3
Soudi-West  64.3  31.4  6.5  17.9  23.2
cities
>200,000 inhabitant  65.7  25.9  3.2  19.6  21.0
100-200,000  ihabitints  68.8  24.0  4.0  17.5  20.7
20-100,000 inhaitants  66.5  29.6  5.6  18.4  23.8
<20,000 inhabitnts  68.0  36.3  7.5  22.1  36.0
Vilages  56.5  30.7  8.9  24.8  24.2
Couple  75.1  45.1  6.7  13.6  39.8
Couple +1 chld  47.6  29.7  2.3  27.8  24.4
Couple +2 chidren  35.9  32.3  5.8  18.2  21.1
Couple +3 chidren  42.2  24.1  9.8  14.9  30.7
Couple +4 or nmre chidren  21.8  22.0  15.8  19.7  24.5
Father + children  45.4  75.4  0.0  0.0  19.4
Modtr  + chldren  50.6  31.8  7.1  34.9  20.5
Odher  61.6  29.0  6.2  23.2  24.3
All  62.9  30.2  6.2  21.8  24.4
60.  The second  best  poverty  alleviation  effect  is achieved  by unemployment  benefits:  30
percent  of recipients  would  be below the  poverty  line without  the benefits.  This effect  is highest- 46 -
in pensioner  and social  income  recipients  households.  It is also  larger  in small  cities  and villages
tun  in large  cities. The pove  reduction  impact of the unemployment  benefit  diminishes  with
household  size: 45 percent  of childless  couples  receiving  unemployment  benefits  are lifted  above
the poverty  line, but this is the case for only 22 percent  of couples  with four or more children.
In contrast,  the  famiy  allowance,  which  is targeted  by the number  of children,  lifts 16 percent
of large recipient families  out of poverty, against  2.3 percent of recipient families  with one
child. Overall  though,  the family  allowances  have only a smaUl  effect  on poverty: 6.2 percent
of recipient  households  are lifted above  the povert  line thanks  to the allowances.  This finding
lends  further  support  to the suggesdons  made  earlier: income-tesing  the family  allowance  would
strengthen  its progressive  distribution  and poverty alleviation  effect. Likwise,  relaxing the
eigibility limits of the unemployment  benefit for workers  in large household  would help to
increase  the impact  of the benefit  where it is most needed.
61.  Other  social  insumnce benefits, while  much  less  important  in absolute  amounts  than
the family  allowance,  have  a relatively  greater poverty  impact  among the recipients:  for 21.8
percent of recipients,  they make the difference  between  being poor and not being poor. The
effect  is strongest  for farmers,  mixed  households  and social  income  recipients,  in villages,  and
in households  with one child  and where  the head  is a single  mother.  It should  be recalled  though
that only a small  fraction  of households  receive these  benefits.
62.  Socia assistce,  the sole income-tested  component  of the safty  net, helps  one in
four recipients  escape  poverty. Somewhat  strangely,  this effect  is concentrated  in low-poverty- 47 -
groups such as pensioners  and the self-employed,  among whom  only a very small percentage
receive socal assistance. This suggests that social assistance does reach the few needy
households  in those  groups  and makes  a significant  difference  for them.  Regionally,  the poverty
alleviation  effect  of social  assistance,  is strongest  in the Cental-Capital  and Central  regions  while
it is lowest  in the South  and South-East.
63.  Even where it does not lift households  above  the poverty  line, the social  safety  net
can have  a major  impact  on households'  living  standards.  One  way  to assess  this is to show  the
trn=fers received  by the  poor  as afmction of the povei%y  gap (Table  24). We noted  earlier  that
the poverty  gap in Poland is 13.2 percent of the minimum  pension, and that this gap is fairly
steady  across socio-economnic  groups (except  social  income  recipients)  and regions.
64.  In total, the social  transfers  received  by the poor are 215 percent  of the (remaining)
poverty gap. This means  that without  the transfers  the poverty  gap would  be about 3.2 times
larger. The last line of Table 24 also shows how the transfers  received  by non-poor  people
compare  to the poverty  gap. It turns out that they are almost  22 times  larger than the after-
transfer poverty  gap and 10 times larger than the transfers  received  by the poor. Even after
excluding  pensions,  transfers  receved by the non-poor  still are more  than twice  as large as the
poverty  gap. In fact, either the unemployment  benefits  or the family  alowance  received  by the
non-poor  would  each  be sufficient  to more than cover  the entire  poverty  gap. While in practice
it is of course  unlikely  and probably  undesirable  that such  drastic  reorientation  would  ever take- 48 -
pLace,  it does  underline  that there is scope  in the total resource  base of the safety  net to reonent
funds towards  the poor.
Table 24. Social transfers and th  poverty gap.
Pension  Unemploy-  Family |  Other  Socida  Total
bellfit  Aillowance  socia  assistancel
insurance  I
Socidal  transfers received by poor households  (expendiure per
equivalent adult below miimum  pension) as % of poverty gap
Worker  37.5  29.9  64.5  10.6  8.5  151.0
Farmer  103.8  19.2  27.0  1.7  4.1  155.9
Worker-farmer  116.3  21.6  58.1  13.5  1.3  210.9
Pensioner  371.7  22.9  34.7  5.0  11.6  446.0
Self-employed  33.2  20.5  53.4  3.9  0.9  111.9
Social benefit recipients  4.9  105.3  37.2  15.4  38.8  201.7
AR  109.1  38.7  46.0  8.8  12.7  215.1
Social  transfes  received by non-poor households  (expenditue
per equivalent  adult above minimum-wage)  as % of the poverty gap
All  1,839.7 1  103.0_  176.3  36.21  25.6  2,180.7
65.  While the figures in this section indicate that social tnsfers  in Poland have a
substantial  degree  of success  in reaching  the poor, there remain  two problems.  First, we have
already  referred  to the leakage  in the system,  whereby  one third  or more  of transfers  go the non-
poor (Table  22). Second,  there remain  a significant  number  of poor, even  among  those  who do
receive  social  tansfers. Table  25 shows  the distribution  of the beneficiaries  of social  transfers
classified  according  to their poverty status  after  the receipt of transfers.  The vast majority  of
social transfer  recipients  are not poor after the receipts  of transfers. The tables  in this section
have indicates  the extent  to which the transfer system  contributes  to this, by being targeted  to- 49 -
households  who are poor before  the transfer  and by closing  partally or completely  the poverty
gap for those  who are poor. Among  recpients of pensions,  only eight  percent  remain  in poverty
after the receipt of the pension.  For other transfers, the figures  are higher, ranging from 13.5
percent  for recipients  of family  allowances  to 28 percent  for social  assistance  recipients.  Clearly
those are the people on whom  the social safety net needs to focus. The proposals  made  in the
next section  aim to reduce  this remaining  poverty.
Table  25. Distribution  of bneficiaries of social  trnsfers  (ex-post  targeting).
Households  below  Households  between  Households  A
penson  mummum  penson  above  minimum
and  minimum  wage  wage
Pensions  8.1%  9.4%  82.5%  100.0%
Unemployment  benefit  21.6%  17.0%  61.4%  100.0%
Family  allowance  13.5%  13%  74.2%  100.0%
Other  social  insurance  22.8%  17.1%  60.1%  100.0%
Social  assistance  28.0%  16.6%  55.4%  100.0%
VII.  Four Proposals to Modify the Social Safety Net
66.  The evidence in the previous sections has indicated that the social safety net in Poland
is quite effective in reducing poverty incidence and the poverty gap. However, there are several
aspects of  the  cunrent allocation rules which  are  sub-optimal from the  poverty  aleviation
perspectve.- 50 -
67.  We present here four proposals  to modify  the socal safety  net in order to increase
its progressivity  and poverty reduction  impact The proposals  pertain only to the non-pension
components,  because  the reform of the pension  system  is discussed  at length  elsewhere  (e.g. see
World Bank, 1993). The proposals  are either budget-neutral  or imply  only modest  increases  in
specific  sodal transfers (which  could  easily  be financed  out of anticipated  savings  from  proposed
reforms  of the pension system).
Proposal A:  Income-testing the  family allowance and  doubling the  amount  for  large
households
68.  The family  allowance  has  been  kept steady  in nominal  terms at 167,000  zl. per month
per eligible  child since the middle  of 1992.  Children  are eligible  up to age 16, or up to age 20
if they are in school. The family  allowance  is received  by a proportionately  larger fraction  of
poor households  and it covers  a larger percentage  of their expenditure  (Tables  15 and 19). The
failure  to adjust  the family  allowance  to cost-of-living  increases  has thus  hurt the poor the most.
It is therefore  proposed  to make  a one-ime adjustment  to the allowance  so that it can adequately
cover  various  needs of children,  such as textbooks,  school  clothing,  health care, etc. at today's
price levels, and to keep it constant  in real terms therefter.  In order to increase the poverty
reduction impact, it is also proposed to income-test the allowance  and to pay it only to
households  with incomes below 50 percent of the average wage (on a per capita basis this
corponded  to 1,759,000  zl. per month  in June 93). Households  with four or more children,
where  poverty  is most  pronounced,  would  receive  twice  the allowance  (so  long as they are below
the income  benchmark).- 51 -
69.  The net effect of income-esting the fily  allowance and doubling  it for large
households  would  be to reduce  poverty  incidence  from 14.4  percent to 13.2  percent  (Cable  26).
The beneficial  impact would  of course  be felt the most in large households,  where the poverty
rate would be reduced from 43 percent to 28 percent. Poverty reductions  would also be
relatively  concentrated  in farmer, mixed,  and social  income  recipient  households,  and be more
pronounced  in villages  than in cities. There would be significant  regional variation, from a
minimum  poverty reduction  of 0.3 percentage  points in the Central region to 2.3 percentage
points in  the Central-East region, due  to  the  different socio-economic  and urban/rural
composition  of each region.
Proposal Bi:  Reducing eligibilty  of the  family allowance to  18 year  and taxing the
allowance
70.  The current  upper age limit of eligibility  of the family  allowance  for school  children
- 20 years  of age - is very generous  and could be reduced  to 18 years. Also, the progressivity
of the allowance  could be enhanced  by taxing it as ordary  income (at existng tax rates).
Implementing  these changes would lead to significant  budgetary savings, but it would also
increase  the poverty  incidence  with one percentage  point. This would hurt large households  the
most, as well as all households  with  children  with relatively  high  incomes,  who are mostly  found
in wvorker  and mixed  households  (Table  26). In practice,  the budgetary  savings  from proposal
BI could be redistributed  to the poor, and one way to do this is suggested  in proposal  B2.- 52 -
Proposal B2: Proposal B1  phs  income-testd day-care vouchers for young children
71.  One  phenomenon  observed  in Poland  since  transition  is the reduced  availabiity  of day
care, which used to be provided by state enterprises  or government.  Private centers have
emerged  but they tend to be too costly  for many low- and middle-income  households.  This
causes  obvious  problems  for one-parnt families,  but even  in families  with  couples  the situation
may prevent one of the parents, usually  the mother, from taldng up a job to enhance  family
income. It is poposed therefore  to introduce  day-care  vouchers  worth about 180,000  zi. per
month per child (i.e. an amount similar to the family  allowance)  and to provide them to
households  with an income  below  the minimum  pension  (on  a per equivalent  adult  or per capita
basis). Children  would  be eligible  for the vouchers  if they are two to six years old.
72.  In the aggregate,  this proposal  would  offset  about  80 percent  of the poverty  increase
from reducing  the age  limit  for the family  allowance  and from taxing  it. The main  beneficiaries
a-e very similar  to those  of proposal  A: large households  and farmer and mixed  households.
Proposal C: Inproved income-testing  of social assistance
73.  Social assistance  is currendy the only income-tested  component  of the social  safety
net in Poland.  Intended  beneficiaies are those households  with per capita  incomes  below the
minimum  pension, and who have a dysfunction  which prevents  them from increasing  their
income  (see Vial, 1994,  for details).  Even though  social  assistance  is better targeted  than the- 53 -
ote  social  safety  net components,  55 percent of beneficiaries  are non-poor  and the amounts
paid to non-poor  households  are acually higher  than those  paid to the poor. This suggests  that
the targeting  of social  assistance  could  still be improved  by more  effective  income-testing  (see,
again, Vial, 1994, for specific  proposals  on how to do this).  In order to simulate  the poverty
impact  of this, we assumed  ffiat  the amounts  paid out to non-poor  households  would  be reduced
by 20 percent as a result of better income-testing.  On average, this would free resources  to
increase  payments  to households  below  the minimum  pension  by about  40 percent.  We assumed
that 30 percent would acually be paid out, and the rest be needed to cover increased
administration  costs  as a result of the more  stringent  income-testing.  As such,  proposal  C would
be entirely  budget-neutraL
74.  Better targeting  of social  assistance  in this fashion  would  reduce  poverty incdence
by about  0.3 percentage  points (rable 26). In practice,  the effect  would  likely  be larger because
the number  of poor beneficiaries  would  also  increase  in addition  to the larger amounts  receved
by the poor. The beneficiaries  of this proposal  would  be all groups  with high  poverty  incidence
and the curmrt main  recipients  of socal assistance  (social  income  recipient  households,  mixed
households,  large households  and those  with single  parents).
Proposal  D: Extending  eligibility  for unemployment  benefits  for low skilled  unemployed  in
large households.
75.  Eligibility  for unemployment  benefits  is currently  limited  to 12 months, except  in
certain high-unemployment  regions and for those unemployed  close to retirement  age. As a- 54 -
result,  more than one  third  of  all  unemployed people in  Poland recve  no benefits.
Unemployment  benefits  are wel targeted  to the poor, mainly  because  the loss of a job greatly
increases the likeihood to be poor. However, the unemployment  benefit could make  a larger
contribution  to closing  the poverty gap for social income recipient households,  where many
unemployed  who have lost their benefits  are concentrated,  and also for large households.  The
loss of unemployment  benefits  is particularly  severe for low-skilled  people whose chances  of
finding  jobs are low in the curent economic  environment.  It is therefore  proposed  to extend  the
eligibility  for people  with low levels of education  (ighest  diploma  from elementary  or lower-
level vocational  school) who are members  of households  with three or more children. This
would increase  the number  of recipients  by about  seven  percnt,  and, if eligibility  was  extended
by 12 months,  would increase  the total cost of unemployment  benefits  by a similar  percentage.
76.  The impact of this would be, in the aggregate,  to reduce  poverty  by 0.4 percentage
points - an  effect similar to  the  social assistance proposal (Table 26).  However, the
concentration  of the effect  would  be different.  Poverty  reduction  would  be strongest  in the social
income  recipient  households,  in the North-East  and South-West  regions,  and in large households.
Any proposal to extend unemployment  benefits cannot ne seen in isolation, but must be
combined  with pro-atve  labor market  policies  aimed, in this case, to increase  the chances  of
finding  jobs for low-education  unemployed.  The mle of training  would obviously  be crucial.- 55 -
Table 26. Povaty  imnpuet  of  elected modificaioms  of the modal  'ety ne 
Actua  Famly allowance  propouals
Poverty
_I  idce 
Proposal  A  Proposal  Bl  Proposal  B2
Povery  Diffcrcce  Poverty  Diffcrence  Poverty  Difference
incidence  . incidence  incidece  _
Workcr  11.0  10.1  -0.9  12.2  +1.2  11.4  +0.4
Farmer  23.3  21.3  -7.0  23.8  +05  22.6  -0.7
Workr-himcr  19.0  16.6  -2.4  20.5  +1.5  19.0  0.0
Pensioner  10.9  10.1  .0.8  11.4  +O.S  11.2  +0.3
$clf-cmpoycd  9.0  8.8  -0.2  10.0  +1.0  9.6  +0.6
Social income recipien  55.9  52.4  -3.5  57.5  +1.6  55.9  0.0
Central-capital  9.6  8.7  .0.9  10.2  +0.6  9.8  +0.2
Cental  11.2  10.9  -0.3  11.9  +0.7  11.5  +0.3
Cenral-Evt  16.5  14.2  -2.3  17.9  +1.4  16.7  + 0.2
Cena1-Wcat  17.0  15.4  -1.6  18.1  +1.1  17.2  +0.2
North  14.1  13.4  -0.7  15.0  +0.9  14.3  +0.2
North-Eat  15.3  13.3  -2.0  16.3  +1.0  15.0  -0.3
South  10.9  10.0  -0.9  11.6  +0.7  10.9  0.0
South-East  18.4  16.8  -1.6  19.9  +1.5  19.0  +0.6
South-West  16.8  15.9  -0.9  17.9  +1.1  17.4  +0.6
Citics
>200,000 inhabittts  5.5  5.3  -0.2  5.8  +0.3  5.5  0.0
100-200,000  inhabitbnt  7.9  7.3  -0.6  8.5  +0.6  8.2  +0.3
20-100,000 inabiants  11.4  10.8  -0.6  12.6  +1.2  12.1  +0.7
<20,000 inabitns  14.2  13.5  -0.7  15.6  +1.4  14.7  +0.5
Villages  22.1  19.9  -2.2  23.4  +1.3  22.2  +0.1
Couplc  3.4  3.4  0.0  3.4  0.0  3.4  0.0
Couple +1  child  6.1  6.1  0.0  6.4  +0.3  6.1  0.0
Couple +2 childen  11.7  11.7  0.0  12.8  +1.1  11.7  0.0
Couple +3 children  22.9  22.8  -0.1  25.0  +2.1  23.0  +0.1
Couple +4  or num  chdren  42.6  28.1  -14.5  46.0  +3.4  44.1  +1S5
Fathcr + children  9.7  9.7  0.0  9.7  0.0  9.7  0.0
Mother + children  16.4  15.3  -1.1  17.1  +0.7  16.7  +0.3
Other  15.6  14.6  -1.0  16.5  +0.9  15.9  +0.3
All  14.4  13.2  -1.2  15.4  +1.0  14.6  +0.2- 56-
Social  assistlnce  proposl  Unemployment  befits  proposal
Poverty  Difference  Povcrty  Difference
incidenc  . incidence  ._  _
Worker  10.8  -0.2  10.6  -0.4
Farmer  23.2  .0.1  23.1  .0.2
Worker-farmer  18.8  -0.2  18.7  -0.3
Pensioner  10.7  -0.2  10.6  -0.3
Self-employed  9.0  0.0  9.0  0.0
Social  income recipient  51.8  -4.1  53.4  -2.5
Centrlcapital  9.3  -0.3  9.3  -0.3
Cental  10.6  -0.6  10.9  -0.3
Cetral-East  16.2  -0.3  16.1  -0.4
Central-West  16.5  -0.5  16.8  -0.2
North  13.9  -0.2  14.0  -0.1
North-East  15.0  -0.3  14.6  -0.7
South  10.7  -0.2  10.5  -0.4
South-East  18.2  -0.2  17.9  -0.5
South-West  16.5  -0.3  16.1  -0.7
cities
>200,000 inhabitants  5.2  -0.3  5.5  0.0
100-200,000  inabitants  7.7  -0.2  7.8  -0.1
20-100,000 inhabitant  11.1  -0.3  11.1  -0.3
<20,000  inhabianu  13.9  -0.3  13.6  -0.6
Villages  21.8  -0.3  21.5  -0.6
Couple  3.4  0.0  3.4  0.0
Couple +1 child  5.7  -0.4  6.1  0.0
Couple +2 children  11.4  -0.3  11.7  0.0
Couple +3 childrn:  22.6  -0.3  21.7  -1.2
Couple +4 or more childrn:  42.1  -0.5  40.9  -1.7
Father + children  8.3  -1.4  9.7  0.0
Moaher + children  13.8  -2.6  16.0  -0.4
Other  15.4  -0.2  15.1  -0.6
AU  14.1  -0.3  14.0 1  -0.4
Note:  Family  aLownce  propo.l  Ai  bIcomeoang  the  famiy  llowance  a  doubfl the  amount  for  lure hauhlds.
Family  allowance  popoul  BI:  Reducing  ligiliqty  to 1 Yea.  and  t&n  the  allowe.
Family  alowanc  pinpoal  B2 Same  u ppouul  Bi. pins  i_Inoatd  day-cm  vouhm for  young  children.
Social  amiatace  propsl: Implved  mcame4esting  of mo auuunce.
Unemployment  benefit.  prpoml:  Eding  unamploymi  beneSt.  to  low kid  unemployed  in lrge houehod.
A  - detailed dewcipfioof  cach  proposl  in ine  The prajecona in thia ablc an  basd  on the  al  housold  composition
and  income  and  expnditur  leve,  of  hanhod  a they  sated oavr  the  perid Jauy-June 1993.- 57  -
Viii  Conclusion
77.  Since the start of transition  in Poland in January 1990, the social safety net has
undergone  important  changes.  The majol one was the introduction  of unemployment  benefits,
as a result of rapidly  emerging  unemployment  The total cost of the social safety  net has isen
sharply,  both  in absolute  real terms  and as a fraction  of GDP.  In the climate  of fiscal  stringency,
the Govemment  of Poland  has understandably  been  concerned  to control  the growth  of the social
budget  and to ensure that spending  achieves  the desired  distributional  objectives.  Therefore,  this
study  has investigated  what the distributional  impact is of the current system,  and how it helps
to alleviate  poverty  in Poland.
78.  In 1993,  26.3  percent of the population  had an expenditure  level (per  equivalent  adult)
below  the minimum  wage, and 14.4  percent  had exeditr  below the minimum  pension. The
highest  and the lowest  poverty incidence occurs in the two new groups which have emerged
since  transition,  respectively,  the social  income  recipients  and the self-employed.  This suggests
that transition  has widened  the distnbution  of the level of livng by extending  the two ends of
the distributLon.  The second  lowest  poverty  incidence  occurs  among  pensioners  and workers,  of
whom  about 11 percent live below the minimum  pension. For pensioners,  this is a reversl of
the situation  pnor to transition, when they consistently  had the highest  poverty figures. For
groups  with  an active  connection  to the labor market,  the highest  poverty  is now  recorded  among
amers.- 58 -
79.  The regional vagaon  in poverty incidence  is less pronounced  than across socio-
economic  group. Nevertheless,  there is a spatial  dimennon  to poverty:  poverty  incidence  is much
higher in villages and in small cities. In large cites (more than 200,000 inhaDitants),  only 5.5
percent  of people  live below the minimum  pension.  This  percentage  uniformly  rises with smaller
city size, and reaches  22 pexcent  in villages.
80.  Demographic  dact  stics are important  indicators  of poverty in Poland. This is
especially  the case for  ype of household.  Only 3.4 percent of childless  couples  fall below the
minimum  pension - many of these households  are pensioners.  The poverty incidence  nses
steadily  with the number of children. Among households  with four or more children, 4:z.6
percent have  an expenditure  level per equivalent  adult below the minmum pension, and 60.8
percent fall  below the minimum  wage.
81.  One corollary  of this is that  povefly among chidren is high in Poland  - one in five
children lives  in a household  with an expenditure level below the minimum  pension. In contrast,
the  poverty  rate among elderly  people (60+) is only  7.6 percent  - one half the national  average.
The strong correlation  between  poverty  and presence  of children  in the household,  makes the
presence  of children  an important  candidate  for the targetng of social  transfers.  Currently,  only
the family allowance  and maternity  care are based on this criterion. By the same token, the
social safety  net seems quite effective  at protectng elderly  people  against  povety and furither
old-age-based  interventions  do not appear  warranted  at this time.-59  -
82.  There is a strong inverse link between  p.very  and edcation.  Where the head of
household  has only vocational  or elementary  education,  poverty  incidence  is twice  as high as in
households  with more education.  Almost  two thirds of the Polish  populadon  lives in households
where the head has only vocational  or elementary  education.
83.  One remarkable feature of the poverty profile in Poland is the relaively low poveily
gap and its very even distibution across all socio-cconomic  groups, regions, or types of
households.  The average  poverty  gap is 16 percent of the minimum  wage  and 13 percent of the
minimum  pension  and varies by no more than two to three percentage  points regardless  of the
classification  considered.  This indicates  that there is no one group or regon in Poland which
forms  a pocket  of deep  poverty  (at least  at the level of aggregation  considered  in this study).  The
sole exception  is the social  income  recipients  who not only have the highest  poverty incidence
but whose  poverty is also more severe than any other group.
84.  Unemployment is a  major cause of  poverty in  Poland. The poverty rate  among
households  where there is at least one unemployed  person  is 27.8 percent - almost twice  the
national  average. Over one third of all poor live in households  where there is an unemployed
member. The strong link between  poverty and unemployment  indicates  that pro-active  labor
market policies  aimed at employment  creation need to  be an important  ingredient  of poverty
alleviation  policy m Poland.  Where  these  policies  are geared  in the first place  to providing  work
to the unemployed, they will have the most immediate poverty alleviation impact. However, the-60 -
link between  poverty and education  suggests  that improved  training  and education  deserves  an
important  role in poverty alleviation  for the medium  and longer  term.
85.  The social safety net in Poland represents 44.9 percent  of the expenditure of an
average  household.  Pensions are the lion's share of this, and by themselves  contribute  36.5
percent to household  expenditure.  Unemployment  benefits  represent  three percent of household
expenditure  and all other non-pension  benefits  5.5 percent.
86.  The  social samfety  net is mildly  progressive, representing 55.1 percent of average
expenditure  of households  below the minimum pension and 42.7 percent of expenditure  of
households  above the minimum  wage. However, this is the sum  of two very different  effects,
due to pensions  and the other  transfers.  The share  of household  expenditure  covered  by pensions
is actually  lower for the poor  than the non-poor. In contrast,  unemployment  benefits  contributes
9.2 percent to the expenditure  of the poor and only 1.8 percent to the expenditure  of the non-
poor (a ratio of 5.1:1). The remaining  soil  transfers make  up 15.6  percent of the expenditure
of the poor against  3.7 percent of those  of the non-poor  (a ratio of 4.2:1). The progressivity  of
the social  safety  net in Poland  is thus  entirey due to the non-pension  components,  especially  the
unemployment  benefits  and the family  allowance.
87.  The success  of a social  transfer system  is not only measured  by the degree  to which
the benefits  are received  by the poor, but also by the extent to which it contributes  to closing
the poverty gap. This depends on the extent to which tansfers go to people or households who- 61 -
are poor pnor to the receipt of the given benefit  (ex-ante  targeting)  and on the amnount  of the
benefit in relation to the poverty gap. While the social transfer system in Poland is fairly
successfil in ec-ante targeting,  a substantial  degree  of leaage  occurs. Unemployment  benefits
and social  assistance  go for  almost  50 percent  to households  who were not poor (above  minimum
pensior.)  before they received  these benefits. In the case of family allowance, 80 percent of
recipients  were not poor prior to the receipt of the allowance.  This means  that, depending  on
the type of tansfer, from 30 to 60 percent  of the amounts  of money  being transferred  go to the
non-poor. This suggests that there is significait  room in the system for  realocation  in favor
of the poor.
88.  In particula,  one can point at the family allowance which has many non-poor
recipients. The share effectively  going to the poor could be enhanced by income-testing  the
famnly allowance and/or by taxing it as ordinary income. In the latter case, the progressivity of
tax rates would ensure  that in net terms a larger share of the allowance  goes to the poor. The
fact that the allowance  has recently  been  held steady  in nominal  terms has also  affected  the poor
proportionately  more. This  could  be addressed  by indexng the allowance  to the  rate of inflation.
The upper  age limit  for eligibility  of the fanily allowance  (20  years) seems  excessively  generous
and a reduction  to 18 years would free resources  to pay in part for the indexation.
89.  Even  though  social  assistance  is the best targeted  of all social  transfers,  it is intended
to be only available  to households  with incomes  below the minimum  pension, and the figures
in this study  show that in practice this is not the case. While some social  assistance  may well- 62 -
be delivered  to dysfunctional  households  above  the income  benchmark,  there is clearly  scope  to
improve  the income-testing  of social assistance.  Moreover,  the amounts  paid out to better-off
households  could be reduced  (smce  now they are slightly  higher  than those going  to the poor).
90.  After social  assistance,  the unemployment  benefit  is the social  safety  net component
which flows to the highest  extent t  the poor. This may call for some reconsideration  of the
eligibility  rules. Poverty  alleviation  is not an explicit  goal of unemployment  compensation,  but
the link between  poverty  and unemploynent  is so strong  in Poland  that unenployment  benefits
have a strong  poverty alleviation  effect We do not advocate  to increase  the benefits,  in order
to avoid  perverse  incentive  effects,  but it could be considered  to increase  the period  of eligibility
for selected  unemployed,  especially  people  with low  levels  of education.  In the current  economic
situation,  they seem  to have the lowest  probability  to find a new  job. In the medium  term, this
problem must  be addressed  by pro-active  labor market  policies  such  as retrainin,, employment
promotion,  etc. In the short term, the situation  of the low-skllled  unemployed  is only bound  to
worsen  when  their unemployment  benefits  run out. In order  to limit  the fiscal  impact,  extension
of eligibility could be limited to workers whose highest diploma is primary education  or
vocatioral school  (lower  levels  only) and those who have  thr  or more children.
91.  A further assessment  of the social safety  net's ability to help the poor can be made
by showing  the tnsfen  receved by the poor as a fridon  of the povefly gap. In total, the
social  transfers  received  by the poor are 215 percent  of the (remaining)  poverty  gap.  This means
that without the transfers the poverty gap would be about 3.2 times larger. However, the- 63  -
tansfers  received by non-poor people are almost 22 times larger than the poverty gap. The
unemployment benefit and the fimily allowances reeived  by non-poor households would each
be suffident to more than cover the enie  poverty gap. While in practice it is of course unlikely
and probably undesirable that such drastic reorientation would ever take place, it does underline
that there is scope in the total resource base of the safety net to reorient funds towards the poor.
92.  In line with the recommendations  made earlier, this reported prsentedfourproposals
to improve selectively the poverty reduction impact of social transfers other than pensions. The
proposals are  either  budget-neutral or  imply only  modest increases in  the  total  amount of
transfers (which could easily be financed out of anticipated savings from proposed reforms of
the pensio  system).
93.  Prposa  A:-  Income4esting thefamily  allowance and doubling the awountfor lawge
households.  This responds to the situation whereby the freezing of the nominal amount of the
family allowance since mid-1992 has disproportionately hurt the poor.  A one-dme revision of
the amount is recommended to ensure adequate coverage of a basket of children's goods and
services at today's prices, after which the amount would remain constant in  real terms.  The
proposal also aims to reduce poverty among children,  which is twice the national average in
Poland. Overall, the proposal would reduce poverty from 14.4 percent to  13.2 percent, but
among large households the reduction would be from 43 percent to 28 percent. The proposal
would also benefit farmer households and rural areas in general.-64 -
94.  Proposal  B: Reducing eWigibilty  of family allowance  to 18 years and taxing the
allowance;  providing  income-tested  day-care  vouchersforyoung children.  The first  part of this
proposal aims to reduce a generous eligibility criterion and to improve the progressivity of the
family allowance. This would however raise poverty by about one percentage point, especialy
among  large  households  and  worker  households.  The  day-care  vouchers  would  largely
compensate for this effect. They would also have beneficial indirect effects, by releasing an
important current constraint, especially on mothers,  to take up a job.
95.  Proposal C: Improved income-testing of  social assistance. Social assistance  is
currently the only income-tested component of  the social safety net in Poland. Even though
social assistance is better targeted than the other social safety net components, 55 percent of
beneficiaries are non-poor and the amounts paid to non-poor households  are actually higher than
those paid to  the  poor.  This  suggests tnat  the  targeing  of  social assistance could be  still
improved by more effective income-testing.  If improved income-tesdng  reduces payments to non-
poor households by 20 percent, this would permit an increase of payments to poor households
by 30 percent and cover increased administration costs of the income-testing,  in a budget-neutral
fashion. Poverty would be reduced by about 0.3 percentage points.
96.  Proposal D: Extending eligibility  for  unemployment benefts  for  low skiled
unemployed  in large households.  Current eigibility for unemployment  benefits  is limited  to 12
months in  most cases.  This  hurts disproportionately low-skilled workers  whose chances of
finding a job  are low in the current economic environment. The unemployment benefit could- 65 -
also make a  larger contribution to closing the poverty gap for  social income recipients
households  where many  unemployed  who  have lost their  benefits  are concentrated,  and for large
households.  It is proposed  to extend  the eligibility  for unemployed  whose  highest  education  is
primary  or lower  vocational  school  and who are members  of large households.  An extension  by
12 months  would increase  recipients  by about seven  percent. It would  reduce  poverty  by about
0.4 percent, but concentrated  in current  high-poverty  groups.REFERENCES
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The 1993 Household Budget Survey
The main data source  for this report was the first six months  (January-June)  of the 1993
Household  Budget  Survey,  undertaken  by the Polish Central Statistical  Office  (GUS). Over  tis
period, 16,051  households  were enumerated,  providing  detailed  data on household  income  and
expenditures,  as well as sdected demographic  and socio-economic  infornation oa household
members.
The survey  is part of a long tradition  of annual household  budget surveys in Poland,
consisting of both cross-sectional  and panel data. These surveys were meant to provide
epresentaive  data on  the four main soci-oeconomic groups in Poland: worler  households,
farmer households,  mixed farmer/worker  households  and pensioner  households.  In 1993, an
important innovation was introduced  to  take  into  account the new  economic reality since
economic  tansition began  in 1990.  In particular, the coverage  and stratificafion  of the survey
was broadened  to include households  whose  main source  of income  was self-employment  in the
non-agricultural  private sector  (hereafter  called 'self-employed"),  and those  who lived  prmarly
from social transfers other than  pensions and/or from casual  work  ereafter called 'social
income  recipients").  Thus 1993 is the first year that the Polish population  was covered  in its
entirety  by the survey.
Table  Al. 1 shows  the distribution  of survey  respondents  by region and socio-economic
group, over the peiod January-June  1993  (16,044  households  - seven  households  were dropped
from the sample  due to missing  information).- 68 -
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Table Al. 1. Original household sample distnbution by  egion ad  SEG.
Fsequency  Worker  Famer  Mixed  Penioner  Self-  Social  Total
(Percn)  Workr-  employed  income  inC4me
Farmer  recipient
Centr.l-Capital  920  181  107  625  111  65  2,009
(5.73)  (1.13)  (0.67)  (3.90)  (0.69)  (0.41)  (12.52)
Central  622  172  8  443  65  54  1,444
(3.88)  (1.07)  (0.55)  (2.76)  (0.41)  (0.34)  (9.00)
Centml-East  290  175  101  241  - 20  16  843
(1.81)  (1.09)  (0.63)  (1.50)  (0.12)  (0. 10)  (5.25)
Central-West  1,047  219  119  659  125  80  2,249
(6.53)  (1.36)  (0.74)  (4.11)  (0.78)  (0.50)  (14.02)
North  879  61  32  458  84  76  1,590
(5.48)  (0.38)  (0.20)  (2.85)  (0.52)  (0.47)  (9.91)
North-East  372  142  34  304  38  42  932
(2.32)  (0.89)  (0.21)  (1.89)  (0.24)  (0.26)  (5-81)
South  1,605  51  78  1,004  143  60  2,941
(10.00)  (0.32)  (0.49)  (6.26)  (0.89)  (0.37)  (18.33)
South-East  821  254  348  730  104  60  2,3 17
(5.12)  (1.58)  (2.17)  (4.55)  (0.65)  (0.37)  (14.44)
South-West  853  45  42  610  86  83  1,719
(5.32  (0.28)  (0.26)  (3.80)  (0.54)  (0.52)  (10.31)
Total  7,409  1,300  949  5,074  776  539  16,044
(46.18)  (8.10)  (5.91)  (31.63)  (4.84)  (3.34).  (100.00)
Note:  For the  definkfio  of regions,  see  Anne 2.
As in the past, the 1993 sample was designed to be a self-weighting  probability sample.
However, also in line with past experience, the survey encountered a fairly large rate of non-
participation (refusal, drop-out, etc.),  in the order of 30 percent. Since this non-participation is
not random, it becomes necessary to assign weights to observations to restore- 69 -
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representativeness.  This was done by GUS according  to the two main stratificafion  criteria:
socio-economic  group  and household  size. Table Al.2 shows  the set of weights  applicable  to the
January-June  1993 data (after normalization  to keep the degrees of freedom of the sample
constant).
Table A1.2. Corective weigts  for Inuay-June  1993  Household  Budget  Survey.
Socio-Economic  Group
Household size  Worker  Farmer  Mixed  Pensioner  Self  Social
Worker-  Employed  income
farmer  recipient
1  1.275  1.161  2.109  1.264  1.230  1.243
2  0.973  1.090  1.021  1.048  1.128  0.972
3  0.929  0.973  0.890  0.940  0.850  1.018
4  0.938  1.050  0.965  0.981  0.936  0.885
5  0.900  0.979  0.971  0.833  0.967  0.&44
6+  0.921  0.975  0.959  0.945  0.967  0.976
Application  of these weights to table Al.I  yidds the "corrected' distribution  of the
households  in the sample,  which was used for the analysis  in the paper.- 70 -
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Table A1.3. Corncted  household mumple  distnbution, by region and SEG.
Frequency  Worker  Pame  Mixed  Pe  .ioe  Self  social  TotL
(Peceent)  worker-  employed  income
l  ____________  ______  _  farm  er  _________  _________  recipi nt
Cenktal-capitd  879  184  102  693  105  67  2,030
(5.48)  (1.15)  (0.63)  (4.32)  (0.66)  (0.42)  (12.6S)
Censtal  594  175  87  491  61  SS  1,463
l_____________  (3.70)  (1.09)  (0.54)  (3.06)  (0.38)  (0.34)  (9.12)
Cetral-East  274  178  98  261  19  1S  844
l______________  (1.71)  (1.11)  (0.61)  (1.62)  (0.12)  (0.09)  (5.26)
Cental-West  990  222  114  712  118  78  2,234
______________  (6.17)  (1.38)  (0.71)  (4.44)  (0.74)  (0.49)  (13.92)
North  831  62  31  409  71'  74  1,575
(5.18)  (0.38)  (0.19)  (3.11)  (0.49)  (0.46)  (9.81)
Nordh-East  353  144  32  328  35  41  934
(2.20)  (0.89)  (0.20)  (2.05)  (0.22)  (0.25)  (5.82)
South  1,527  52  77  1,093  13S  60  2,945
(9.52)  (0.32)  (0.48)  (6.82)  (0.84)  (0.38)  (18.36)
South-East  777  260  333  783  100  58  2,310
(4.84)  (1.62)  (2.08)  (4.88)  (0.62)  (0.36)  (14.40)
South-West  80B  46  40  655  81  79  1,710
(5.04)  (0.29)  (0.25)  (4.08)  (0.51)  (0.50)  (1g.66)
Total  7,033  1,322  913  5,514  735  528  16,044
(43.83)  (8.24)  (5.69)  (34.37)  (4.58)  (3.29)  (100.00)Annex  2
inflation  and Regional Price Differences
The household  expenditure  data used in this report have been expressed  in June 1993
Warsaw  prices. This required the use of two prce  deflators. Since the expenditure  data were
collected  monthly, the monthly  CPI was used to express  all expenditures  in June 1993  prices.
l____________________________________  Montly  CPI
January  1993  89.700
Februaty 1993  92.750
March 1993  94.698
April 1993  96.876
May1  3  98.619
June 1993  100.00
Nect, regional  pnce differences  were taken into account. Average  pnces were obtained
from GUTS  for 212 household  expenditure  items, for each  voivodship.  The latter were aggregated
into nine regions (Table A2.1 and map). The 212 items were combined  into 37 expenditure
categones, as used by GUS to calculae the CPI (Table A2.2). Then, a Paasche index was
constructed  using  the  Waraw region ("Central-capital")  as reference  region  (Table  A2.3). Even
though  some  price differences  of 20-30  percent or more were observed  for a number  of items,
when aggregated  into expenditure categrie  regional pri  differences  did not exceed five
percent in most cases (table A2.4). However,  the regional prce  differences  for services  were
somewhat  larger than for govee  's  Table A2.3 shows, for ecpenditures  as a whole, regional
price differences  do not exceed two percent. For the analysis  in the paper,-72  -
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household expenditures were divided by this regional price index, which ensures that measures
of level of living and poverty are properly adjusted for regional price differences.
Table A2. 1. Classihcation of voivodsiip. into regioni.
Region  Voivodip
1. CVncapital  SL Waraawskie,  Ciecbaowkie,  Ostrolecie,  Radomside, Siedleckie
2. Central  Lodzie,  Piotrmwslcie, Plockie, Siradzie,  Siderniewickie
3. Centml-East  Bialskopodlaskie,  Chelmslde, LIbelskie,  Zamojskie
4. Centml-West  Bydgoskie, Kaliskde,  Koniuside, L  zynslie,  Pilskie, Poznside,
|___________________  Tonskie,  Wlockawside
S. North  Elblasie,  Gdanskie, Kozainslacie, Slupskie, Szczecinskie
6. North-East  Bialoatocide, Lomzynskie, Olty2sie,  Suwaldde
7. South  Bielskie, Czestochowskie,  Katowickie, Opolikie
S. South-East  iGelecide,  Krakowslie, Krosumide,  Nowosadeckie,  Przemyskie,
Rzeszowskie.  Ta nobrcsie,  Tarnowskie
9. South-West  Gormwskde, Jeleniogorslie, Lcgmicie, Walbrzykide,  Wrocklawsie,
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Table A2.2. Expenditur  categories for price intx.
Goods  72.50%
Foods  38.93%
1.  Cerals, bread, macarni, flour, ctc.  4.66%
2.  Poao,  fruits and  vegetblcs  5.74%
3.  Mat  and mea product  12.66%
4.  Fsh and fish  product  1.08%
5.  Fat (butter,  oil, ctc.)  2.55%
6.  Dairy  products  3.80%
7.  Eggp  0.81%
8.  Sugar  and  sugar  products  2.70%
9.  Other  foods  2.83%
10. Food  in rcBtauxuats  2.10%
Alcohol  4.58%
11. Wne, ber,  vodka,  et.  4.58%
Non-food  28.99%
12. Clothing  5.19%
13.  Shocs  2.41%
14. Furni  and housing  equipmcnt  2.90%
15. Coal  and  products  for heating  2.45%
16. Medication  1.45%
17. Washing,  cleaning  and beauty  products  2.78%
18. Books,  magazincs,  newspapers,  stationary  1.40%
19. Electronic  devices,  music  instwuments,  toys and sport gDods  1.23%
20. ClocIk,  watches  and  jewelry  0.15%
21. Cars, bicycles,  etc.  1.06%
22. Gasoline  and oil (for  cars)  2.51%
23. Tobacco  products  2.19%
24. Other  non-food  items  3.27%
Services  27.50%
25. Dressmaking  and shoe  repair  0.26%
26. Housing  (rt  repairs)  3.98%
27. Ccntral  heing  and hot water  2.98%
28. Electricity  3.05%
29. Gas (for  cooking  and  heating)  1.91%
30. Health  0.97%
31. Cleaning,  laundry  and bamuty  0.47%
32. Education  1.75%
33. Spoit, reaation  and culture  2.56%
34. Trnsportaton  2.06%
35. Car mainenace  0.72%
36. Conumnicazon  0.91%
37. Other  services  528%-75  -
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Table A2.4. Regional price relatives by exnture  categowy.
Expendie  ategoy  Central-  Cental  Centra-  Cenurl-  Noah  Notth-  Soudb  South-  South-
__________  _capit  Eai  Weat  Eon  Et  Wed
Cebs,  bred,
macaroni  flr,  etc.  1.0  1.00  0.99  0.96  0.99  0.99  0.99  0.97  1.01
Polauta,  fuit.  ad
vegeubla  1.00  0.95  0.91  I.02  1.06  1.00  1.06  0.95  1.07
Meaad  menetproducts  1.00  1.00  0.98  0.96  0.99  0.97  1.01  0.9S  1.04
Fab and fis  products  1.00  0.96  0.98  0.98  0.97  1.00  0.97  1.00  1.01
Fat (buter, oil, etc.)  1.00  1.04  1.04  0.93  0.99  1.00  1.01  1.02  0.99
Dairy products  1.00  0.95  0.9 7  0.97  1.01  0.98  0.99  0.99  1.02
Egg  1.00  1.02  0.94  1.01  0.98  1.00  1.03  1.04  1.01
Sugar and  uger  product  1.00  0.96  0.95  0.99  0.99  0.99  0.99  0.97  1.02
Other  foods  1.00  1.01  1.03  0.97  0.98  1.01  1.00  097  1.00
Food in reaaurm  1.00  0.99  0.98  0.97  1.00  099  1.01  0.98  1.03
Wic,  beer, vodka, cm.  1.00  1.01  1.02  1.02  1.07  1.07  1.07  .00  1.07
Clothing  1.00  0.99  1.03  1.01  1.06  1.11  1.06  1.01  1.08
Shoes  1.00  0.98  0.97  0.98  1.05  1.00  1.03  0.94  1.05
Funitue  and  hwuing
equiPlent  1.00  1.00  1.03  0.97  1.0  1.08  1.04  .0  1.05
Coal and  product. for
heating  1.00  1.00  0.91  0.95  0.99  0.9  0.81  0.90  0.94
Medicamio  1.00  0.98  1.01  1.00  0.98  0.97  0.99  0.98  0.99
Waabing.  clanwS and
be"  pduct  1.00  0.99  1.03  0.98  1.01  1.10  1.05  0.99  1.07
Bookw.  m1g.jnW  1
newspapes.  sataionary  I  1.00 1  1.03 1  0.96  0.97  0.99 j  1.01 I  1.03  1.02  1.01- 76 -
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l.Vpendlire catgoq  COrL_  C_na_  Central-  Cnl-  Nonh  Noth-  South  South-  South-
cap-j  _  Ea.t  West  East  EAmt  Wes
Electkroic  device,
muaic  ianatu"  mn,  toy.
nd  sportgoods  1.00  1.00  1.02  1.01  1.08  1.01  1.01  0.99  1.01
Cock,  waiches ad_
jewelry  1.00  1.08  1.04  0.97  1.04  1.33  1.11  1.08  1.08
Crs,  bicycles, etc.  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  0  1.00
Gamola.  and oil (for
car)  1  n  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  100  1.00  1.00
Tobacco product  1.00  0.99  1.01  1.01  1.02  0.97  1.02  L.M  1.03
Other r-fooditem  1.00  1.00  1.02  0.99  1.03  1.07  1.04  0.99  1.05
Housing (m,  repair.)  1.00  0.97  1.01  1.00  1.01  0.97  0.99  1.00  102
Central heating and hot
water  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00
Electricity  1.00  1.00  0  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00
Gas (fir  cooking and
|hcatin  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00
Health cam  1.00  0.90  0.84  0.88  0.96  0.92  0.92  0.  S  0.82
Ceatig,  laundy  and  1.00  0.94  0.75  0.85  0.96  0.90  0.94  0.93  0.97
beaty 
Education  1.00  0.98  0.92  1.00  1.04  1.01  1.01  0.98  1.03
Spot,  recion  and
culum  1.00  1.02  1.00  0.98  0.99  0.96  0.99  0.95  0.99
Transpotation  1.00 J  0.96  0.99  0.97  0.97  0.98  0.99  0.97  0.98
Communation  1.00  1.00  I.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  I  1.00  1.00  1.00
Other services  1.00  0.98  0.9S  0.96  0.99  0.97  0.98  0.97  0.9SAnnex  3
Poverty and the Composition  of Household Income and Expenditure
This paper has focused  on the social  safety net as a policy  tool to help the poor. There  are
of course many otier ingredients  of a poverty alleviation  policy.  We made a brief reference  in
the paper to education  policy, in view of the strong link in Poland between a low level of
education  on the one hand, and unemployment  and poverty on the other hand. Suitable  labor
market polices,  ranging from better vacancy information  systems  and placement offices to
taining and retraining, public works, promoton of small-scale  enterptises, etc. can all have
important  pover  lications  (see Rutkowski, 1994). In geneal, policies to enhance  returns
to labor are likely to help the poor, who  now denve a below-average  share  of income  from work
(table  A3.  1). On the outflow  side,  the pattern  of household  exenditure differs  markedly  between
the poor and non-poor and across socio-economic  groups as well (Table A3.2). PoLcies  to
reduce  or abolish  subsidices  will thus have varying  implications  on different household  groups.
Since it is outside the scope of this paper to develop  policy suggestions  in these areas, the
following  two tables on the composition  of household income and expenditure  by poverty
category and soaio-econonic group are provided merly  as basic information, and to meet
several  requests to that effect.- 78  -
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Table A3.1. The  _om  of  omold  incom
e  of  incm  fo 
Work  Social  Gifts  Otber  Total
Houseols  below  m  pmm  s-
30.2  51.2  5.8  12.7  100.0
Houshods  betwem mii
p-  nd  -nimum  wagp
36.0  48.6  3.7  11.6  100.0
Households  above mmiimum  wage
___________________________  43.4  46.3  4.0  6.4  100.0
Worker  79.4  16.2  3.4  1.2  100.0
Fmer  0.7  36.9  3.7  58.8  100.0
Worker-fimr  52.9  25.1  1.4  20.6  100.0
P  _nsoe  5.0  89.8  2.7  2.6  100.0
Self-enlayed  27.2  S2.3  13.9  6.6  100.0
Social  income ecipient  3.5  70.S  23.4  2.6  100.0
I  AI1  L  41.3  47.1  4.1  7.5  100.0A3.3
Table A3.2. The composition  of household expenditure.
|________  ________  ________  Percentage  of expenditure  for
Food  Alcohol  &  Clothing  Home  Other  Health  Education  Tramp, &  Ohe  TOl
Tabacco  mamt-  goods  & leisure  communication  Avimca
.___  ___  ____  _  .__.  enance  5& ac
Houscholds  below minimum  pension
60.1  3.1  3.1  9.9  1.2  4.8  3.0  3.9  11.0  100.0
Households  bctwcen  minimum
pension  and minimum  wage
52.0  3.0  3.7  12.0  1.6  5.2  3S  4.8  14.2  100.0 
lHouseholds  above minimum  wage
39.2  2.6  5.5  15.0  2.7  6.2  5.3  6.7  16.7  100.0
Worker  38.9  2.9  5.7  13.8  2.4  5.4  6.2  71  17.6  100.0
Farmer  57.1  3.3  5.3  8.9  2.2  5.0  3.3  6.4  8.6  100.0
Worker-farmer  50.7  2.9  5.8  S.S  2.5  4.6  3.4  7IS  13.8  100.0
Pensioner  41.9  2.1  4.0  17.0  2,5  7.2  3.6  4.5  17.3  100.0
Self-employed  41.4  3.0  6.5  13.3  2.4  5.9  7.0  10.1  105  100.0
Social  income recipient  53.4  4.1  4.8  14.4  2.0  .S6  4.8  4.3  6.6  100.0
UIALl  _  42.7  2.7  S.1  14.2  2.4  6.0  4.9  6.2  15.8  0.O0Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
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